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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-53423 — Unauthenticated denial-of-service via BEAM atom table exhaustion in membrane_mp4_plugin</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-53423</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; membraneframework membrane_mp4_plugin&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in membraneframework membrane_mp4_plugin allows unauthenticated denial-of-service via BEAM atom table exhaustion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MP4 box header parser converts each 4-byte box name to an atom using String.to_atom/1 without validation. &amp;#39;Elixir.Membrane.MP4.Container.Header&amp;#39;:parse_box_name/1 in lib/membrane_mp4/container/header.ex interns every box name encountered while &amp;#39;Elixir.Membrane.MP4.Container.Header&amp;#39;:parse/1 walks the input. BEAM atoms are never garbage-collected, so each unique attacker-controlled 4-byte name is a permanent allocation. A crafted MP4 of approximately 8 MB containing roughly 1.1 million boxes with distinct non-standard names exhausts the atom table (default ceiling around 1,048,576 atoms), aborting the entire BEAM node and taking down all applications running on it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects membrane_mp4_plugin from 0.3.0 before 0.36.7.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; membraneframework membrane_mp4_plugin&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in membraneframework membrane_mp4_plugin allows unauthenticated denial-of-service via BEAM atom table exhaustion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MP4 box header parser converts each 4-byte box name to an atom using String.to_atom/1 without validation. &amp;#39;Elixir.Membrane.MP4.Container.Header&amp;#39;:parse_box_name/1 in lib/membrane_mp4/container/header.ex interns every box name encountered while &amp;#39;Elixir.Membrane.MP4.Container.Header&amp;#39;:parse/1 walks the input. BEAM atoms are never garbage-collected, so each unique attacker-controlled 4-byte name is a permanent allocation. A crafted MP4 of approximately 8 MB containing roughly 1.1 million boxes with distinct non-standard names exhausts the atom table (default ceiling around 1,048,576 atoms), aborting the entire BEAM node and taking down all applications running on it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects membrane_mp4_plugin from 0.3.0 before 0.36.7.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-53423</guid>
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