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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 22:07:24 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-50568 — Fission: SanitizeFilePath lexical HasPrefix bypass permits sibling-directory escape</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-50568</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; fission&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.25.0, SanitizeFilePath in pkg/utils/utils.go validated that a path stayed under a safe directory by calling strings.HasPrefix(path, safedir). This is a lexical check, not a directory boundary check: /packages-extra/evil starts with /packages, so it passed. The function did not enforce a path-separator boundary, so any sibling directory whose name began with the safe-directory string was accepted. Callers included the builder&amp;#39;s Clean handler (pkg/builder/builder.go:208) and the fetcher&amp;#39;s Fetch / Upload handlers (pkg/fetcher/fetcher.go). A tenant who could pre-create or control a sibling directory under the fetcher / builder&amp;#39;s shared volume could induce a write or read outside the intended safe directory. This issue has been patched in version 1.25.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; fission&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.25.0, SanitizeFilePath in pkg/utils/utils.go validated that a path stayed under a safe directory by calling strings.HasPrefix(path, safedir). This is a lexical check, not a directory boundary check: /packages-extra/evil starts with /packages, so it passed. The function did not enforce a path-separator boundary, so any sibling directory whose name began with the safe-directory string was accepted. Callers included the builder&amp;#39;s Clean handler (pkg/builder/builder.go:208) and the fetcher&amp;#39;s Fetch / Upload handlers (pkg/fetcher/fetcher.go). A tenant who could pre-create or control a sibling directory under the fetcher / builder&amp;#39;s shared volume could induce a write or read outside the intended safe directory. This issue has been patched in version 1.25.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-50568</guid>
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