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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 08:10:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-46618 — Fission builder accepts arbitrary buildcmd strings from Environment.spec.builder.command,   allowing the builder pod to…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-46618</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; fission&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.23.0, before the round-1 security sweep, pkg/builder/builder.go passed Environment.spec.builder.command directly into exec.Command(...) after a strings.Fields split, with no validation of the executable path or its arguments. A user who could create or update Environment CRDs in a namespace observed by the buildermgr could thereby point the builder pod at any executable inside the builder image (e.g. /bin/sh -c &amp;#39;...&amp;#39;) and execute arbitrary code in the builder pod context. This issue has been patched in version 1.23.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; fission&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.23.0, before the round-1 security sweep, pkg/builder/builder.go passed Environment.spec.builder.command directly into exec.Command(...) after a strings.Fields split, with no validation of the executable path or its arguments. A user who could create or update Environment CRDs in a namespace observed by the buildermgr could thereby point the builder pod at any executable inside the builder image (e.g. /bin/sh -c &amp;#39;...&amp;#39;) and execute arbitrary code in the builder pod context. This issue has been patched in version 1.23.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-46618</guid>
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