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      <title>CVE-2026-45550 — Roxy-WI: IDOR on PUT /smon/check — any user can rewrite any tenant's monitoring URL/IP/body</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45550</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; roxy-wi&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant&amp;#39;s HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; roxy-wi&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant&amp;#39;s HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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