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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 00:34:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-49842 — FreeSWITCH: Pre-authentication bandwidth amplification via `mod_verto` speed-test frames</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-49842</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; signalwire freeswitch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary telecom switches to a software implementation that runs on any commodity hardware. Prior to version 1.11.1, mod_verto&amp;#39;s WebSocket frame loop intercepts a #-prefixed speed-test protocol (#SPU / #SPB / #SPE) before any authentication check. The declared payload size in #SPU was parsed with atoi() and only rejected non-positive values, so an unauthenticated peer could request up to INT_MAX bytes. The server then wrote roughly size * 10 bytes back during the download phase, on the order of 20 GB per request, yielding strong outbound bandwidth amplification from a short request. This issue has been patched in version 1.11.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; signalwire freeswitch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary telecom switches to a software implementation that runs on any commodity hardware. Prior to version 1.11.1, mod_verto&amp;#39;s WebSocket frame loop intercepts a #-prefixed speed-test protocol (#SPU / #SPB / #SPE) before any authentication check. The declared payload size in #SPU was parsed with atoi() and only rejected non-positive values, so an unauthenticated peer could request up to INT_MAX bytes. The server then wrote roughly size * 10 bytes back during the download phase, on the order of 20 GB per request, yielding strong outbound bandwidth amplification from a short request. This issue has been patched in version 1.11.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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