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      <title>CVE-2026-9185 — 6Storage Rentals &lt;= 2.22.0 - Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference to Arbitrary User Disclosure and Modifica…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-9185</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; sixstorage 6Storage Rentals&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The 6Storage Rentals plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in all versions up to and including 2.22.0 via the `userId` parameter of the `six_storage_get_user_info` and `six_storage_update_profile` AJAX actions. This is due to the `six_storage_getUserInfo()` and `six_storage_updateProfile()` functions being registered on `wp_ajax_nopriv_*` hooks and accepting a tenant identifier directly from `$_POST[&amp;#39;userId&amp;#39;]` without performing any ownership verification, session binding, or nonce validation to confirm the requester has a legitimate relationship to the supplied ID. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read and modify arbitrary tenants&amp;#39; profile data — including name, email address, phone number, physical address, and SSN — by supplying an enumerated `userId` value in a crafted request to either handler.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; sixstorage 6Storage Rentals&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The 6Storage Rentals plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in all versions up to and including 2.22.0 via the `userId` parameter of the `six_storage_get_user_info` and `six_storage_update_profile` AJAX actions. This is due to the `six_storage_getUserInfo()` and `six_storage_updateProfile()` functions being registered on `wp_ajax_nopriv_*` hooks and accepting a tenant identifier directly from `$_POST[&amp;#39;userId&amp;#39;]` without performing any ownership verification, session binding, or nonce validation to confirm the requester has a legitimate relationship to the supplied ID. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read and modify arbitrary tenants&amp;#39; profile data — including name, email address, phone number, physical address, and SSN — by supplying an enumerated `userId` value in a crafted request to either handler.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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