https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 07 Oct 2026 23:42:01 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-49755 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> wojtekmach req</p> <p>Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in wojtekmach Req allows attacker-controlled HTTP servers to exhaust memory in a Req client via decompression-bomb response bodies.</p> <p>Req&#39;s default response pipeline includes Req.Steps.decode_body/1 and Req.Steps.decompress_body/1 in lib/req/steps.ex. decode_body/1 dispatches on the server-supplied content-type (or URL extension) and calls :zip.extract(body, [:memory]) for application/zip, :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory]) for application/x-tar, and :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory, :compressed]) for application/gzip / .tgz. Each returns the full decompressed archive contents as a [{name, bytes}] list in memory, with no per-entry or total size cap. decompress_body/1 walks the content-encoding header and chains :zlib/:brotli/:ezstd decoders, so a response advertising content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip inflates through multiple layers without bound.</p> <p>Both steps are enabled by default, no caller opt-in is required, and the attacker controls the content-type and content-encoding headers on their own server (or on any host reached via Req&#39;s automatic redirect following). A sub-megabyte response can expand to multiple gigabytes on the victim, crashing the BEAM process.</p> <p>This issue affects req: from 0.1.0 before 0.6.1.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> wojtekmach req</p> <p>Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in wojtekmach Req allows attacker-controlled HTTP servers to exhaust memory in a Req client via decompression-bomb response bodies.</p> <p>Req&#39;s default response pipeline includes Req.Steps.decode_body/1 and Req.Steps.decompress_body/1 in lib/req/steps.ex. decode_body/1 dispatches on the server-supplied content-type (or URL extension) and calls :zip.extract(body, [:memory]) for application/zip, :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory]) for application/x-tar, and :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory, :compressed]) for application/gzip / .tgz. Each returns the full decompressed archive contents as a [{name, bytes}] list in memory, with no per-entry or total size cap. decompress_body/1 walks the content-encoding header and chains :zlib/:brotli/:ezstd decoders, so a response advertising content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip inflates through multiple layers without bound.</p> <p>Both steps are enabled by default, no caller opt-in is required, and the attacker controls the content-type and content-encoding headers on their own server (or on any host reached via Req&#39;s automatic redirect following). A sub-megabyte response can expand to multiple gigabytes on the victim, crashing the BEAM process.</p> <p>This issue affects req: from 0.1.0 before 0.6.1.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-49755