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      <title>CVE-2026-8839 — MapPress Maps for WordPress &lt;= 2.96.6 - Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference via REST API Endpoints</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-8839</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; chrisvrichardson MapPress Maps for WordPress&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MapPress Maps for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in all versions up to, and including, 2.96.6. This is due to missing ownership verification in the REST API routes registered via `Mappress_Api::rest_api_init()`, where the GET `/wp-json/mapp/v1/maps/{mapid}` endpoint uses `&amp;#39;permission_callback&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;__return_true&amp;#39;` and the write endpoints (POST update, DELETE, PATCH mutate, POST clone, POST empty_trash) only check the generic `edit_posts` capability without confirming that the requester owns the targeted map — a gap that is not compensated at the model layer, as `Mappress_Map::get()`, `save()`, `delete()`, `mutate()`, and `empty_trash()` all operate on any caller-supplied map ID without an ownership check. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read sensitive map data — including POI titles, addresses, coordinates, and body content — for any map on the site by enumerating map IDs, and for authenticated attackers with Contributor-level access and above to modify, delete, trash/restore, or clone any map regardless of its author.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; chrisvrichardson MapPress Maps for WordPress&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MapPress Maps for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in all versions up to, and including, 2.96.6. This is due to missing ownership verification in the REST API routes registered via `Mappress_Api::rest_api_init()`, where the GET `/wp-json/mapp/v1/maps/{mapid}` endpoint uses `&amp;#39;permission_callback&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;__return_true&amp;#39;` and the write endpoints (POST update, DELETE, PATCH mutate, POST clone, POST empty_trash) only check the generic `edit_posts` capability without confirming that the requester owns the targeted map — a gap that is not compensated at the model layer, as `Mappress_Map::get()`, `save()`, `delete()`, `mutate()`, and `empty_trash()` all operate on any caller-supplied map ID without an ownership check. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read sensitive map data — including POI titles, addresses, coordinates, and body content — for any map on the site by enumerating map IDs, and for authenticated attackers with Contributor-level access and above to modify, delete, trash/restore, or clone any map regardless of its author.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-8839</guid>
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