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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 12:50:24 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-47179 — Arcane: Authenticated Arbitrary Host File Read via Docker Compose Include Directives in Arcane</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47179</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; getarcaneapp arcane&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 1.19.4, ProjectService.GetProjectFileContent returns the contents of any Docker Compose include directive declared in a project&amp;#39;s compose file before any path-traversal validation runs. Because ProjectService.CreateProject writes attacker-supplied compose content to disk without validating include paths, an authenticated user can create a project whose compose file declares include: [&amp;#39;../../../../etc/passwd&amp;#39;], then read the include via the project file API. The result is arbitrary read of any file readable by the Arcane backend process, including /app/data/arcane.db (the SQLite database containing every user&amp;#39;s password hash and API key), enabling escalation to admin and, via Arcane&amp;#39;s Docker control plane, RCE on the host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.19.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; getarcaneapp arcane&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 1.19.4, ProjectService.GetProjectFileContent returns the contents of any Docker Compose include directive declared in a project&amp;#39;s compose file before any path-traversal validation runs. Because ProjectService.CreateProject writes attacker-supplied compose content to disk without validating include paths, an authenticated user can create a project whose compose file declares include: [&amp;#39;../../../../etc/passwd&amp;#39;], then read the include via the project file API. The result is arbitrary read of any file readable by the Arcane backend process, including /app/data/arcane.db (the SQLite database containing every user&amp;#39;s password hash and API key), enabling escalation to admin and, via Arcane&amp;#39;s Docker control plane, RCE on the host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.19.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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