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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 11:08:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-45707 — n8n-MCP: Multi-tenant MCP requests fall back to process-level n8n credentials when tenant headers are absent or incompl…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45707</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; czlonkowski n8n-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;n8n-MCP is an MCP server that provides AI assistants access to n8n node documentation, properties, and operations. Prior to 2.51.2, when ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT=true, the HTTP transport documents that the target n8n instance is selected per-request from x-n8n-url / x-n8n-key headers. Requests that omitted those headers — or supplied only one of them — silently fell back to the process-level N8N_API_URL / N8N_API_KEY credentials configured for the operator&amp;#39;s own n8n instance. As a result, an authenticated MCP tenant could cause n8n management calls to execute against the operator&amp;#39;s instance instead of its own. This affects HTTP-mode deployments of n8n-mcp that are run as a shared multi-tenant service. Single-tenant deployments (ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT unset or false) are not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.51.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; czlonkowski n8n-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;n8n-MCP is an MCP server that provides AI assistants access to n8n node documentation, properties, and operations. Prior to 2.51.2, when ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT=true, the HTTP transport documents that the target n8n instance is selected per-request from x-n8n-url / x-n8n-key headers. Requests that omitted those headers — or supplied only one of them — silently fell back to the process-level N8N_API_URL / N8N_API_KEY credentials configured for the operator&amp;#39;s own n8n instance. As a result, an authenticated MCP tenant could cause n8n management calls to execute against the operator&amp;#39;s instance instead of its own. This affects HTTP-mode deployments of n8n-mcp that are run as a shared multi-tenant service. Single-tenant deployments (ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT unset or false) are not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.51.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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