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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-44885 — Portainer: Path traversal in backup archive extraction allows arbitrary file write</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44885</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; portainer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Portainer Community Edition is a lightweight service delivery platform for containerized applications that can be used to manage Docker, Swarm, Kubernetes and ACI environments. From 2.33.0 to before 2.33.8, Portainer&amp;#39;s backup restore feature accepts a .tar.gz archive and extracts it to a target directory on the server. The extraction function (ExtractTarGz in api/archive/targz.go) constructed output paths using filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(outputDirPath, header.Name)). This combination does not prevent directory traversal — a tar entry named ../../etc/cron.d/evil resolves to a path outside the extraction root, so a crafted archive can write files to arbitrary locations on the server filesystem. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.33.8.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; portainer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Portainer Community Edition is a lightweight service delivery platform for containerized applications that can be used to manage Docker, Swarm, Kubernetes and ACI environments. From 2.33.0 to before 2.33.8, Portainer&amp;#39;s backup restore feature accepts a .tar.gz archive and extracts it to a target directory on the server. The extraction function (ExtractTarGz in api/archive/targz.go) constructed output paths using filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(outputDirPath, header.Name)). This combination does not prevent directory traversal — a tar entry named ../../etc/cron.d/evil resolves to a path outside the extraction root, so a crafted archive can write files to arbitrary locations on the server filesystem. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.33.8.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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