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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 08:23:18 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-44330 — free5GC: NEF nnef-pfdmanagement API is unauthenticated; forged bearer tokens can read PFD data and create/delete PFD su…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44330</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; free5gc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC&amp;#39;s NEF mounts the nnef-pfdmanagement route group without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can use a forged or arbitrary bearer token (e.g. Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token) to read PFD application data via GET /applications and GET /applications/{appID}, and to create or delete PFD change-notification subscriptions via POST /subscriptions and DELETE /subscriptions/{subID}. Same root cause as the other NEF SBI findings: the route group is mounted without any inbound auth middleware. Unlike the OAM and traffic-influence groups, nnef-pfdmanagement IS declared in the runtime ServiceList, so this is the production-intended path that operators expect to be protected by OAuth2 setting receive from NRF: true -- and it is not. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; free5gc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC&amp;#39;s NEF mounts the nnef-pfdmanagement route group without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can use a forged or arbitrary bearer token (e.g. Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token) to read PFD application data via GET /applications and GET /applications/{appID}, and to create or delete PFD change-notification subscriptions via POST /subscriptions and DELETE /subscriptions/{subID}. Same root cause as the other NEF SBI findings: the route group is mounted without any inbound auth middleware. Unlike the OAM and traffic-influence groups, nnef-pfdmanagement IS declared in the runtime ServiceList, so this is the production-intended path that operators expect to be protected by OAuth2 setting receive from NRF: true -- and it is not. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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