https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 07 Oct 2026 15:20:34 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-39803 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> mtrudel bandit</p> <p>Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via memory exhaustion.</p> <p>The chunked clause of &#39;Elixir.Bandit.HTTP1.Socket&#39;:read_data/2 in lib/bandit/http1/socket.ex ignores the caller-supplied :length option when reading HTTP/1 chunked request bodies. Instead of capping the accumulated body at the configured limit (e.g. Plug.Parsers&#39; default 8 MB), do_read_chunked_data!/5 buffers every received chunk into an iolist unconditionally and materializes the entire body as a single binary. The function always returns {:ok, body, ...}, so callers cannot interpose a 413 response.</p> <p>Because Plug.Parsers runs before routing and authentication in the standard Phoenix endpoint, an unauthenticated attacker needs no valid route or credentials. Sending a single Transfer-Encoding: chunked POST request with an arbitrarily large body to any path causes the BEAM process to exhaust available memory and be terminated by the OS OOM killer.</p> <p>The content-length path in the same function correctly enforces the limit and is not affected.</p> <p>This issue affects bandit: from 1.4.0 before 1.11.1.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> mtrudel bandit</p> <p>Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via memory exhaustion.</p> <p>The chunked clause of &#39;Elixir.Bandit.HTTP1.Socket&#39;:read_data/2 in lib/bandit/http1/socket.ex ignores the caller-supplied :length option when reading HTTP/1 chunked request bodies. Instead of capping the accumulated body at the configured limit (e.g. Plug.Parsers&#39; default 8 MB), do_read_chunked_data!/5 buffers every received chunk into an iolist unconditionally and materializes the entire body as a single binary. The function always returns {:ok, body, ...}, so callers cannot interpose a 413 response.</p> <p>Because Plug.Parsers runs before routing and authentication in the standard Phoenix endpoint, an unauthenticated attacker needs no valid route or credentials. Sending a single Transfer-Encoding: chunked POST request with an arbitrarily large body to any path causes the BEAM process to exhaust available memory and be terminated by the OS OOM killer.</p> <p>The content-length path in the same function correctly enforces the limit and is not affected.</p> <p>This issue affects bandit: from 1.4.0 before 1.11.1.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-39803