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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 12:25:17 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-5843 — Docker Model Runner container-to-host code execution via MLX-LM model_file importlib loading</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-5843</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Docker Desktop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MLX inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS uses the MLX-LM library, which unconditionally imports and executes arbitrary Python files from model directories via the model_file configuration field in config.json. When a model&amp;#39;s config.json specifies a model_file pointing to a Python file, MLX-LM uses importlib to load and execute it with no trust_remote_code gate or equivalent safety check. The MLX backend runs without sandboxing, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the Docker host as the Docker Desktop user.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any container on the Docker network can trigger this by calling the model-runner.docker.internal API to pull a malicious model from an attacker-controlled OCI registry and request inference.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Docker Desktop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MLX inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS uses the MLX-LM library, which unconditionally imports and executes arbitrary Python files from model directories via the model_file configuration field in config.json. When a model&amp;#39;s config.json specifies a model_file pointing to a Python file, MLX-LM uses importlib to load and execute it with no trust_remote_code gate or equivalent safety check. The MLX backend runs without sandboxing, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the Docker host as the Docker Desktop user.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any container on the Docker network can trigger this by calling the model-runner.docker.internal API to pull a malicious model from an attacker-controlled OCI registry and request inference.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-5843</guid>
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