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      <title>CVE-2026-33233 — AutoGPT Platform: Remote Code Execution via Unsafe Pickle Deserialization of Redis Cache Entries</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-33233</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Significant-Gravitas AutoGPT&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AutoGPT is a workflow automation platform for creating, deploying, and managing continuous artificial intelligence agents. In versions 0.6.34 through 0.6.51, the backend deserializes Redis cache bytes using pickle.loads without integrity/authenticity checks. The write path serializes values with pickle.dumps(...) into Redis and the read path blindly invokes pickle.loads(...) on bytes with no HMAC/signature or strict schema validation gating deserialization. If an attacker can poison a shared-cache key in Redis, arbitrary command execution is possible in the backend container context, affecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This issue has been fixed in version 0.6.52.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Significant-Gravitas AutoGPT&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AutoGPT is a workflow automation platform for creating, deploying, and managing continuous artificial intelligence agents. In versions 0.6.34 through 0.6.51, the backend deserializes Redis cache bytes using pickle.loads without integrity/authenticity checks. The write path serializes values with pickle.dumps(...) into Redis and the read path blindly invokes pickle.loads(...) on bytes with no HMAC/signature or strict schema validation gating deserialization. If an attacker can poison a shared-cache key in Redis, arbitrary command execution is possible in the backend container context, affecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This issue has been fixed in version 0.6.52.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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