https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 09 Oct 2026 23:59:22 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44588 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> siyuan-note siyuan</p> <p>SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, he tooltip mouseover handler in app/src/block/popover.ts reads aria-label via getAttribute and passes it through decodeURIComponent before assigning to messageElement.innerHTML in app/src/dialog/tooltip.ts:41. The encoder used at the producer side, escapeAriaLabel in app/src/util/escape.ts:19-25, only handles HTML special characters (&#34;, &#39;, &lt;, literal &amp;lt;) — it leaves %XX URL-escapes untouched. So a doc title containing %3Cimg src=x onerror=...%3E round-trips through escapeAriaLabel and the HTML attribute layer unmodified. Then decodeURIComponent on the consumer side converts %3C to a literal &lt; character (a real &lt;, NOT a character reference). When that string is assigned to innerHTML, the HTML5 tokenizer enters TagOpenState on the literal &lt;, parses the &lt;img&gt; element, and the onerror handler fires. Because the renderer runs with nodeIntegration: true, contextIsolation: false, webSecurity: false (app/electron/main.js:407-411), require(&#39;child_process&#39;) is reachable from the injected handler, escalating to arbitrary code execution.This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> siyuan-note siyuan</p> <p>SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, he tooltip mouseover handler in app/src/block/popover.ts reads aria-label via getAttribute and passes it through decodeURIComponent before assigning to messageElement.innerHTML in app/src/dialog/tooltip.ts:41. The encoder used at the producer side, escapeAriaLabel in app/src/util/escape.ts:19-25, only handles HTML special characters (&#34;, &#39;, &lt;, literal &amp;lt;) — it leaves %XX URL-escapes untouched. So a doc title containing %3Cimg src=x onerror=...%3E round-trips through escapeAriaLabel and the HTML attribute layer unmodified. Then decodeURIComponent on the consumer side converts %3C to a literal &lt; character (a real &lt;, NOT a character reference). When that string is assigned to innerHTML, the HTML5 tokenizer enters TagOpenState on the literal &lt;, parses the &lt;img&gt; element, and the onerror handler fires. Because the renderer runs with nodeIntegration: true, contextIsolation: false, webSecurity: false (app/electron/main.js:407-411), require(&#39;child_process&#39;) is reachable from the injected handler, escalating to arbitrary code execution.This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44588