<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 18 Oct 2026 16:00:17 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-42541 — Kubewarden: RBAC Reconnaissance via unchecked can_i host capability call</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-42541</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; kubewarden-controller&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kubewarden is a policy engine for Kubernetes. Prior to , An attacker with privileged AdmissionPolicy or AdmissionPolicyGroup create permissions (which isn&amp;#39;t the default) can craft a policy that makes use of the can_i host callback. The callback issues a SubjectAccessReview (SAR) requests to enumerate RBAC permissions of any user or service account across the cluster. can_i does not perform that check to enforce the context-aware allow-list and forwards the request directly to the callback handler, which executes a real SubjectAccessReview using policy-server privileges. This creates a policy-level authorization gap: can_i is effectively usable even when the policy has no context-aware resource grant. This is an information disclosure / reconnaissance issue, and not direct workload data exfiltration. The attacker learns permission information, such as whether specific service accounts can &amp;#34;get secrets&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;create pods&amp;#34;, or &amp;#34;bind clusterroles&amp;#34; in chosen namespaces. This vulnerability is fixed in .&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; kubewarden-controller&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kubewarden is a policy engine for Kubernetes. Prior to , An attacker with privileged AdmissionPolicy or AdmissionPolicyGroup create permissions (which isn&amp;#39;t the default) can craft a policy that makes use of the can_i host callback. The callback issues a SubjectAccessReview (SAR) requests to enumerate RBAC permissions of any user or service account across the cluster. can_i does not perform that check to enforce the context-aware allow-list and forwards the request directly to the callback handler, which executes a real SubjectAccessReview using policy-server privileges. This creates a policy-level authorization gap: can_i is effectively usable even when the policy has no context-aware resource grant. This is an information disclosure / reconnaissance issue, and not direct workload data exfiltration. The attacker learns permission information, such as whether specific service accounts can &amp;#34;get secrets&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;create pods&amp;#34;, or &amp;#34;bind clusterroles&amp;#34; in chosen namespaces. This vulnerability is fixed in .&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-42541</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
