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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-43877 — WWBN AVideo: CSRF in userSavePhoto.php Allows Cross-Origin Overwrite of Any Logged-in User's Profile Photo with Arbitra…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-43877</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; WWBN AVideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 29.0, objects/userSavePhoto.php is a legacy profile-photo endpoint that accepts a base64 POST parameter and writes the decoded bytes to videos/userPhoto/photo&amp;lt;users_id&amp;gt;.png. Its only access control is User::isLogged(). It does not end in .json.php, so it is excluded from the project&amp;#39;s global autoCSRFGuard (which is suffix-scoped in objects/include_config.php). There is no CSRF token, no Origin/Referer check, and no MIME validation of the decoded bytes. Because AVideo&amp;#39;s default cookie policy is SameSite=None; Secure on HTTPS (objects/functionsPHP.php:227), an attacker who lures a logged-in user to a malicious page can overwrite that user&amp;#39;s profile photo with arbitrary bytes and also triggers a site-wide clearCache(true) on every forged request. Commit 9c38468041505e637101c5943c5370c68f48e3ac contains an updated fix.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; WWBN AVideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 29.0, objects/userSavePhoto.php is a legacy profile-photo endpoint that accepts a base64 POST parameter and writes the decoded bytes to videos/userPhoto/photo&amp;lt;users_id&amp;gt;.png. Its only access control is User::isLogged(). It does not end in .json.php, so it is excluded from the project&amp;#39;s global autoCSRFGuard (which is suffix-scoped in objects/include_config.php). There is no CSRF token, no Origin/Referer check, and no MIME validation of the decoded bytes. Because AVideo&amp;#39;s default cookie policy is SameSite=None; Secure on HTTPS (objects/functionsPHP.php:227), an attacker who lures a logged-in user to a malicious page can overwrite that user&amp;#39;s profile photo with arbitrary bytes and also triggers a site-wide clearCache(true) on every forged request. Commit 9c38468041505e637101c5943c5370c68f48e3ac contains an updated fix.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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