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      <title>CVE-2021-41037</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2021-41037</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; The Eclipse Foundation Eclipse Equinox p2, eclipse equinox_p2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In Eclipse p2, installable units are able to alter the Eclipse Platform installation and the local machine via touchpoints during installation. Those touchpoints can, for example, alter the command-line used to start the application, injecting things like agent or other settings that usually require particular attention in term of security. Although p2 has built-in strategies to ensure artifacts are signed and then to help establish trust, there is no such strategy for the metadata part that does configure such touchpoints. As a result, it&amp;#39;s possible to install a unit that will run malicious code during installation without user receiving any warning about this installation step being risky when coming from untrusted source.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; The Eclipse Foundation Eclipse Equinox p2, eclipse equinox_p2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In Eclipse p2, installable units are able to alter the Eclipse Platform installation and the local machine via touchpoints during installation. Those touchpoints can, for example, alter the command-line used to start the application, injecting things like agent or other settings that usually require particular attention in term of security. Although p2 has built-in strategies to ensure artifacts are signed and then to help establish trust, there is no such strategy for the metadata part that does configure such touchpoints. As a result, it&amp;#39;s possible to install a unit that will run malicious code during installation without user receiving any warning about this installation step being risky when coming from untrusted source.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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