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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 09:44:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-44336 — PraisonAI MCP `tools/call` path-traversal and RCE via Python `.pth` injection</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44336</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.34, PraisonAI&amp;#39;s MCP (Model Context Protocol) server (praisonai mcp serve) registers four file-handling tools by default — praisonai.rules.create, praisonai.rules.show, praisonai.rules.delete, and praisonai.workflow.show. Each accepts a path or filename string from MCP tools/call arguments and joins it onto ~/.praison/rules/ (or, for workflow.show, accepts an absolute path) with no containment check. The JSON-RPC dispatcher passes params[&amp;#34;arguments&amp;#34;] blind to each handler via **kwargs without validating against the advertised input schema. By setting rule_name=&amp;#34;../../&amp;lt;some-path&amp;gt;&amp;#34; an attacker walks out of the rules directory and writes any file the running user can write. Dropping a Python .pth file into the user site-packages directory escalates this primitive to arbitrary code execution in any subsequent Python process the user spawns — the next praisonai CLI invocation, an IDE script run, the user&amp;#39;s python REPL, or any background Python service. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.34.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.34, PraisonAI&amp;#39;s MCP (Model Context Protocol) server (praisonai mcp serve) registers four file-handling tools by default — praisonai.rules.create, praisonai.rules.show, praisonai.rules.delete, and praisonai.workflow.show. Each accepts a path or filename string from MCP tools/call arguments and joins it onto ~/.praison/rules/ (or, for workflow.show, accepts an absolute path) with no containment check. The JSON-RPC dispatcher passes params[&amp;#34;arguments&amp;#34;] blind to each handler via **kwargs without validating against the advertised input schema. By setting rule_name=&amp;#34;../../&amp;lt;some-path&amp;gt;&amp;#34; an attacker walks out of the rules directory and writes any file the running user can write. Dropping a Python .pth file into the user site-packages directory escalates this primitive to arbitrary code execution in any subsequent Python process the user spawns — the next praisonai CLI invocation, an IDE script run, the user&amp;#39;s python REPL, or any background Python service. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.34.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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