<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 00:34:05 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-34462 — Sandboxie-Plus ProcessServer boxname stack buffer overflows via unterminated wide string copy</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-34462</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; sandboxie-plus Sandboxie&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sandboxie-Plus is an open source sandbox-based isolation software for Windows. In versions 1.17.2 and earlier, several ProcessServer handlers (KillAllHandler, SuspendAllHandler, and RunSandboxedHandler) copy a WCHAR boxname[34] field from request structures into WCHAR[40] stack buffers using wcscpy without verifying null termination. Because the service pipe accepts variable-length packets larger than the request structure, an attacker can fill the boxname field with non-zero data and append additional controlled wide characters after the structure. wcscpy then reads past the fixed field and overflows the destination stack buffer. The service pipe is created with a NULL DACL, allowing any local process to connect, and the unsafe copy occurs before authorization checks. This can lead to a crash of the SbieSvc service or potential code execution as SYSTEM. This issue has been fixed in version 1.17.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; sandboxie-plus Sandboxie&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sandboxie-Plus is an open source sandbox-based isolation software for Windows. In versions 1.17.2 and earlier, several ProcessServer handlers (KillAllHandler, SuspendAllHandler, and RunSandboxedHandler) copy a WCHAR boxname[34] field from request structures into WCHAR[40] stack buffers using wcscpy without verifying null termination. Because the service pipe accepts variable-length packets larger than the request structure, an attacker can fill the boxname field with non-zero data and append additional controlled wide characters after the structure. wcscpy then reads past the fixed field and overflows the destination stack buffer. The service pipe is created with a NULL DACL, allowing any local process to connect, and the unsafe copy occurs before authorization checks. This can lead to a crash of the SbieSvc service or potential code execution as SYSTEM. This issue has been fixed in version 1.17.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-34462</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
