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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 15:48:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-7584 — Arbitrary Code Execution via Unsafe Deserialization in LabOne Q</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-7584</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Zurich Instruments LabOne Q&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The LabOne Q serialization framework uses a class-loading mechanism (import_cls) to dynamically import and instantiate Python classes during deserialization. Prior to the fix, this mechanism accepted arbitrary fully-qualified class names from the serialized data without any validation of the target class or restriction on which modules could be imported. An attacker can craft a serialized experiment file that causes the deserialization engine to import and instantiate arbitrary Python classes with attacker-controlled constructor arguments, resulting in arbitrary code execution in the context of the user running the Python process. Exploitation requires the victim to load a malicious file using LabOne Q&amp;#39;s deserialization functions, for example a compromised experiment file shared for collaboration or support purposes.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Zurich Instruments LabOne Q&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The LabOne Q serialization framework uses a class-loading mechanism (import_cls) to dynamically import and instantiate Python classes during deserialization. Prior to the fix, this mechanism accepted arbitrary fully-qualified class names from the serialized data without any validation of the target class or restriction on which modules could be imported. An attacker can craft a serialized experiment file that causes the deserialization engine to import and instantiate arbitrary Python classes with attacker-controlled constructor arguments, resulting in arbitrary code execution in the context of the user running the Python process. Exploitation requires the victim to load a malicious file using LabOne Q&amp;#39;s deserialization functions, for example a compromised experiment file shared for collaboration or support purposes.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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