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      <title>CVE-2026-5080 — Dancer::Session::Abstract versions through 1.3522 for Perl generates session ids insecurely</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-5080</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; BIGPRESH Dancer::Session::Abstract&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dancer::Session::Abstract versions through 1.3522 for Perl generates session ids insecurely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The session id is generated from summing the character codepoints of the absolute pathname with the process id, the epoch time and calls to the built-in rand() function to return a number between 0 and 999-billion, and concatenating that result three times.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The path name might be known or guessed by an attacker, especially for applications known to be written using Dancer with standard installation locations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The epoch time can be guessed by an attacker, and may be leaked in the HTTP header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The process id comes from a small set of numbers, and workers may have sequential process ids.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The built-in rand() function is seeded with 32-bits and is considered unsuitable for security applications.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Predictable session ids could allow an attacker to gain access to systems.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; BIGPRESH Dancer::Session::Abstract&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dancer::Session::Abstract versions through 1.3522 for Perl generates session ids insecurely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The session id is generated from summing the character codepoints of the absolute pathname with the process id, the epoch time and calls to the built-in rand() function to return a number between 0 and 999-billion, and concatenating that result three times.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The path name might be known or guessed by an attacker, especially for applications known to be written using Dancer with standard installation locations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The epoch time can be guessed by an attacker, and may be leaked in the HTTP header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The process id comes from a small set of numbers, and workers may have sequential process ids.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The built-in rand() function is seeded with 32-bits and is considered unsuitable for security applications.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Predictable session ids could allow an attacker to gain access to systems.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-5080</guid>
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