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      <title>CVE-2026-40928 — AVideo: Missing CSRF Protection on State-Changing JSON Endpoints Enables Forced Comment Creation, Vote Manipulation, an…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40928</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; WWBN AVideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and prior, multiple AVideo JSON endpoints under `objects/` accept state-changing requests via `$_REQUEST`/`$_GET` and persist changes tied to the caller&amp;#39;s session user, without any anti-CSRF token, origin check, or referer check. A malicious page visited by a logged-in victim can silently cast/flip the victim&amp;#39;s like/dislike on any comment (`objects/comments_like.json.php`), post a comment authored by the victim on any video, with attacker-chosen text (`objects/commentAddNew.json.php`), and/or delete assets from any category (`objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php`) when the victim has category management rights. Each endpoint is reachable from a browser via a simple `&amp;lt;img src=&amp;#34;…&amp;#34;&amp;gt;` tag or form submission, so exploitation only requires the victim to load an attacker-controlled HTML resource. Commit 7aaad601bd9cd7b993ba0ee1b1bea6c32ee7b77c contains a fix.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; WWBN AVideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and prior, multiple AVideo JSON endpoints under `objects/` accept state-changing requests via `$_REQUEST`/`$_GET` and persist changes tied to the caller&amp;#39;s session user, without any anti-CSRF token, origin check, or referer check. A malicious page visited by a logged-in victim can silently cast/flip the victim&amp;#39;s like/dislike on any comment (`objects/comments_like.json.php`), post a comment authored by the victim on any video, with attacker-chosen text (`objects/commentAddNew.json.php`), and/or delete assets from any category (`objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php`) when the victim has category management rights. Each endpoint is reachable from a browser via a simple `&amp;lt;img src=&amp;#34;…&amp;#34;&amp;gt;` tag or form submission, so exploitation only requires the victim to load an attacker-controlled HTML resource. Commit 7aaad601bd9cd7b993ba0ee1b1bea6c32ee7b77c contains a fix.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40928</guid>
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