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      <title>CVE-2026-40880 — Zebra: Cached Mempool Verification Bypasses Consensus Rules for Ahead-of-Tip Blocks</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40880</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ZcashFoundation zebrad, ZcashFoundation zebra-consensus&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.2, a logic error in Zebra&amp;#39;s transaction verification cache could allow a malicious miner to induce a consensus split. By carefully submitting a transaction that is valid for height H+1 but invalid for H+2 and then mining that transaction in a block at height H+2, a miner could cause vulnerable Zebra nodes to accept an invalid block, leading to a consensus split from the rest of the Zcash network. This vulnerability is fixed in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ZcashFoundation zebrad, ZcashFoundation zebra-consensus&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.2, a logic error in Zebra&amp;#39;s transaction verification cache could allow a malicious miner to induce a consensus split. By carefully submitting a transaction that is valid for height H+1 but invalid for H+2 and then mining that transaction in a block at height H+2, a miner could cause vulnerable Zebra nodes to accept an invalid block, leading to a consensus split from the rest of the Zcash network. This vulnerability is fixed in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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