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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-39971 — Serendipity: Host Header Injection leads to SMTP header injection via unvalidated HTTP_HOST</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-39971</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; s9y Serendipity&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Serendipity is a PHP-powered weblog engine. In versions 2.6-beta2 and below, the email sending functionality in include/functions.inc.php inserts $_SERVER[&amp;#39;HTTP_HOST&amp;#39;] directly into the Message-ID SMTP header without validation, and the existing sanitization function serendipity_isResponseClean() is not called on HTTP_HOST before embedding it. An attacker who can control the Host header during an email-triggering action such as comment notifications or subscription emails can inject arbitrary SMTP headers into outgoing emails. This enables identity spoofing, reply hijacking via manipulated Message-ID threading, and email reputation abuse through the attacker&amp;#39;s domain being embedded in legitimate mail headers. This issue has been fixed in version 2.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; s9y Serendipity&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Serendipity is a PHP-powered weblog engine. In versions 2.6-beta2 and below, the email sending functionality in include/functions.inc.php inserts $_SERVER[&amp;#39;HTTP_HOST&amp;#39;] directly into the Message-ID SMTP header without validation, and the existing sanitization function serendipity_isResponseClean() is not called on HTTP_HOST before embedding it. An attacker who can control the Host header during an email-triggering action such as comment notifications or subscription emails can inject arbitrary SMTP headers into outgoing emails. This enables identity spoofing, reply hijacking via manipulated Message-ID threading, and email reputation abuse through the attacker&amp;#39;s domain being embedded in legitimate mail headers. This issue has been fixed in version 2.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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