<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 22:45:32 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-40070 — bsv-sdk and bsv-wallet persist unverified certifier signatures in acquire_certificate (direct and issuance paths)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40070</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; sgbett bsv-ruby-sdk, sgbett bsv-sdk, sgbett bsv-wallet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BSV Ruby SDK is the Ruby SDK for the BSV blockchain. From 0.3.1 to before 0.8.2, BSV::Wallet::WalletClient#acquire_certificate persists certificate records to storage without verifying the certifier&amp;#39;s signature over the certificate contents. In acquisition_protocol: &amp;#39;direct&amp;#39;, the caller supplies all certificate fields (including signature:) and the record is written to storage verbatim. In acquisition_protocol: &amp;#39;issuance&amp;#39;, the client POSTs to a certifier URL and writes whatever signature the response body contains, also without verification. An attacker who can reach either API (or who controls a certifier endpoint targeted by the issuance path) can forge identity certificates that subsequently appear authentic to list_certificates and prove_certificate.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; sgbett bsv-ruby-sdk, sgbett bsv-sdk, sgbett bsv-wallet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BSV Ruby SDK is the Ruby SDK for the BSV blockchain. From 0.3.1 to before 0.8.2, BSV::Wallet::WalletClient#acquire_certificate persists certificate records to storage without verifying the certifier&amp;#39;s signature over the certificate contents. In acquisition_protocol: &amp;#39;direct&amp;#39;, the caller supplies all certificate fields (including signature:) and the record is written to storage verbatim. In acquisition_protocol: &amp;#39;issuance&amp;#39;, the client POSTs to a certifier URL and writes whatever signature the response body contains, also without verification. An attacker who can reach either API (or who controls a certifier endpoint targeted by the issuance path) can forge identity certificates that subsequently appear authentic to list_certificates and prove_certificate.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40070</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
