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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 17:46:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-40158 — PraisonAI has Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') and Protection Mechanism Failure in praisonai</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40158</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI&amp;#39;s AST-based Python sandbox can be bypassed using type.__getattribute__ trampoline, allowing arbitrary code execution when running untrusted agent code. The _execute_code_direct function in praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py uses AST filtering to block dangerous Python attributes like __subclasses__, __globals__, and __bases__. However, the filter only checks ast.Attribute nodes, allowing a bypass. The sandbox relies on AST-based filtering of attribute access but fails to account for dynamic attribute resolution via built-in methods such as type.getattribute, resulting in incomplete enforcement of security restrictions. The string &amp;#39;__subclasses__&amp;#39; is an ast.Constant, not an ast.Attribute, so it is never checked against the blocked list. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI&amp;#39;s AST-based Python sandbox can be bypassed using type.__getattribute__ trampoline, allowing arbitrary code execution when running untrusted agent code. The _execute_code_direct function in praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py uses AST filtering to block dangerous Python attributes like __subclasses__, __globals__, and __bases__. However, the filter only checks ast.Attribute nodes, allowing a bypass. The sandbox relies on AST-based filtering of attribute access but fails to account for dynamic attribute resolution via built-in methods such as type.getattribute, resulting in incomplete enforcement of security restrictions. The string &amp;#39;__subclasses__&amp;#39; is an ast.Constant, not an ast.Attribute, so it is never checked against the blocked list. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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