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      <title>CVE-2026-40107 — SiYuan Affected by Zero-Click NTLM Hash Theft and Blind SSRF via Mermaid Diagram Rendering</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40107</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; siyuan-note siyuan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.6.4, SiYuan configures Mermaid.js with securityLevel: &amp;#34;loose&amp;#34; and htmlLabels: true. In this mode, &amp;lt;img&amp;gt; tags with src attributes survive Mermaid&amp;#39;s internal DOMPurify and land in SVG &amp;lt;foreignObject&amp;gt; blocks. The SVG is injected via innerHTML with no secondary sanitization. When a victim opens a note containing a malicious Mermaid diagram, the Electron client fetches the URL. On Windows, a protocol-relative URL (//attacker.com/image.png) resolves as a UNC path (\\attacker.com\image.png). Windows attempts SMB authentication automatically, sending the victim&amp;#39;s NTLMv2 hash to the attacker. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.6.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; siyuan-note siyuan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.6.4, SiYuan configures Mermaid.js with securityLevel: &amp;#34;loose&amp;#34; and htmlLabels: true. In this mode, &amp;lt;img&amp;gt; tags with src attributes survive Mermaid&amp;#39;s internal DOMPurify and land in SVG &amp;lt;foreignObject&amp;gt; blocks. The SVG is injected via innerHTML with no secondary sanitization. When a victim opens a note containing a malicious Mermaid diagram, the Electron client fetches the URL. On Windows, a protocol-relative URL (//attacker.com/image.png) resolves as a UNC path (\\attacker.com\image.png). Windows attempts SMB authentication automatically, sending the victim&amp;#39;s NTLMv2 hash to the attacker. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.6.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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