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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 19:33:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-39888 — PraisonAIAgents has a sandbox escape via exception frame traversal in `execute_code` (subprocess mode)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-39888</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.115, execute_code() in praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools defaults to sandbox_mode=&amp;#34;sandbox&amp;#34;, which runs user code in a subprocess wrapped with a restricted __builtins__ dict and an AST-based blocklist. The AST blocklist embedded inside the subprocess wrapper (blocked_attrs of python_tools.py) contains only 11 attribute names — a strict subset of the 30+ names blocked in the direct-execution path. The four attributes that form a frame-traversal chain out of the sandbox are all absent from the subprocess list (__traceback__, tb_frame, f_back, and f_builtins). Chaining these attributes through a caught exception exposes the real Python builtins dict of the subprocess wrapper frame, from which exec can be retrieved and called under a non-blocked variable name — bypassing every remaining security layer. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.115.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.115, execute_code() in praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools defaults to sandbox_mode=&amp;#34;sandbox&amp;#34;, which runs user code in a subprocess wrapped with a restricted __builtins__ dict and an AST-based blocklist. The AST blocklist embedded inside the subprocess wrapper (blocked_attrs of python_tools.py) contains only 11 attribute names — a strict subset of the 30+ names blocked in the direct-execution path. The four attributes that form a frame-traversal chain out of the sandbox are all absent from the subprocess list (__traceback__, tb_frame, f_back, and f_builtins). Chaining these attributes through a caught exception exposes the real Python builtins dict of the subprocess wrapper frame, from which exec can be retrieved and called under a non-blocked variable name — bypassing every remaining security layer. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.115.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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