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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-34605 — SiYuan: Reflected XSS via SVG namespace prefix bypass in SanitizeSVG ( getDynamicIcon, unauthenticated )</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-34605</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; siyuan-note siyuan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. From version 3.6.0 to before version 3.6.2, the SanitizeSVG function introduced in version 3.6.0 to fix XSS in the unauthenticated /api/icon/getDynamicIcon endpoint can be bypassed by using namespace-prefixed element names such as &amp;lt;x:script xmlns:x=&amp;#34;http://www.w3.org/2000/svg&amp;#34;&amp;gt;. The Go HTML5 parser records the element&amp;#39;s tag as &amp;#34;x:script&amp;#34; rather than &amp;#34;script&amp;#34;, so the tag check passes it through. The SVG is served with Content-Type: image/svg+xml and no Content Security Policy; when a browser opens the response directly, its XML parser resolves the prefix to the SVG namespace and executes the embedded script. This issue has been patched in version 3.6.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; siyuan-note siyuan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. From version 3.6.0 to before version 3.6.2, the SanitizeSVG function introduced in version 3.6.0 to fix XSS in the unauthenticated /api/icon/getDynamicIcon endpoint can be bypassed by using namespace-prefixed element names such as &amp;lt;x:script xmlns:x=&amp;#34;http://www.w3.org/2000/svg&amp;#34;&amp;gt;. The Go HTML5 parser records the element&amp;#39;s tag as &amp;#34;x:script&amp;#34; rather than &amp;#34;script&amp;#34;, so the tag check passes it through. The SVG is served with Content-Type: image/svg+xml and no Content Security Policy; when a browser opens the response directly, its XML parser resolves the prefix to the SVG namespace and executes the embedded script. This issue has been patched in version 3.6.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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