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      <title>CVE-2026-34172 — Giskard Agents have Server-side template injection via ChatWorkflow.chat() using non-sandboxed Jinja2 Environment</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-34172</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Giskard-AI giskard-oss&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Giskard is an open-source Python library for testing and evaluating agentic systems. Prior to versions 0.3.4 and 1.0.2b1, ChatWorkflow.chat(message) passes its string argument directly as a Jinja2 template source to a non-sandboxed Environment. A developer who passes user input to this method enables full remote code execution via Jinja2 class traversal. The method name chat and parameter name message naturally invite passing user input directly, but the string is silently parsed as a Jinja2 template, not treated as plain text. This issue has been patched in versions 0.3.4 and 1.0.2b1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Giskard-AI giskard-oss&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Giskard is an open-source Python library for testing and evaluating agentic systems. Prior to versions 0.3.4 and 1.0.2b1, ChatWorkflow.chat(message) passes its string argument directly as a Jinja2 template source to a non-sandboxed Environment. A developer who passes user input to this method enables full remote code execution via Jinja2 class traversal. The method name chat and parameter name message naturally invite passing user input directly, but the string is silently parsed as a Jinja2 template, not treated as plain text. This issue has been patched in versions 0.3.4 and 1.0.2b1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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