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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 13:02:44 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-33418 — @dicebear/converter ensureSize() Vulnerable to SVG Dimension Capping Bypass via XML Comment Injection</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-33418</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; dicebear&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DiceBear is an avatar library for designers and developers. Prior to version 9.4.2, the `ensureSize()` function in `@dicebear/converter` used a regex-based approach to rewrite SVG `width`/`height` attributes, capping them at 2048px to prevent denial of service. This size capping could be bypassed by crafting SVG input that causes the regex to match a non-functional occurrence of `&amp;lt;svg` before the actual SVG root element. When the SVG is subsequently rendered via `@resvg/resvg-js` on the Node.js code path, it renders at the attacker-specified dimensions, potentially causing out-of-memory crashes. In version 9.4.2, the regex-based approach has been replaced with XML-aware processing using `fast-xml-parser` to correctly identify and modify the SVG root element&amp;#39;s attributes. Additionally, a `fitTo` constraint has been added to the `renderAsync` call as defense-in-depth, ensuring the rendered output is always bounded regardless of SVG content.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; dicebear&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DiceBear is an avatar library for designers and developers. Prior to version 9.4.2, the `ensureSize()` function in `@dicebear/converter` used a regex-based approach to rewrite SVG `width`/`height` attributes, capping them at 2048px to prevent denial of service. This size capping could be bypassed by crafting SVG input that causes the regex to match a non-functional occurrence of `&amp;lt;svg` before the actual SVG root element. When the SVG is subsequently rendered via `@resvg/resvg-js` on the Node.js code path, it renders at the attacker-specified dimensions, potentially causing out-of-memory crashes. In version 9.4.2, the regex-based approach has been replaced with XML-aware processing using `fast-xml-parser` to correctly identify and modify the SVG root element&amp;#39;s attributes. Additionally, a `fitTo` constraint has been added to the `renderAsync` call as defense-in-depth, ensuring the rendered output is always bounded regardless of SVG content.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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