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      <title>CVE-2026-32940 — SiYuan has a SanitizeSVG bypass via data:text/xml in getDynamicIcon (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-29183)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-32940</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; siyuan-note siyuan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, SanitizeSVG has an incomplete blocklist — it blocks data:text/html and data:image/svg+xml in href attributes but misses data:text/xml and data:application/xml, both of which can render SVG with JavaScript execution. The unauthenticated /api/icon/getDynamicIcon endpoint serves user-controlled input (via the content parameter) directly into SVG markup using fmt.Sprintf with no escaping, served as Content-Type: image/svg+xml. This creates a click-through XSS: a victim navigates to a crafted URL, sees an SVG with an injected link, and clicking it triggers JavaScript via the bypassed MIME types. The attack requires direct navigation to the endpoint or &amp;lt;object&amp;gt;/&amp;lt;embed&amp;gt; embedding, since &amp;lt;img&amp;gt; tag rendering in the frontend doesn&amp;#39;t allow interactive links. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; siyuan-note siyuan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, SanitizeSVG has an incomplete blocklist — it blocks data:text/html and data:image/svg+xml in href attributes but misses data:text/xml and data:application/xml, both of which can render SVG with JavaScript execution. The unauthenticated /api/icon/getDynamicIcon endpoint serves user-controlled input (via the content parameter) directly into SVG markup using fmt.Sprintf with no escaping, served as Content-Type: image/svg+xml. This creates a click-through XSS: a victim navigates to a crafted URL, sees an SVG with an injected link, and clicking it triggers JavaScript via the bypassed MIME types. The attack requires direct navigation to the endpoint or &amp;lt;object&amp;gt;/&amp;lt;embed&amp;gt; embedding, since &amp;lt;img&amp;gt; tag rendering in the frontend doesn&amp;#39;t allow interactive links. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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