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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 09:16:28 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-29112 — @dicebear/converter vulnerable to ncontrolled memory allocation via crafted SVG dimensions</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-29112</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; dicebear&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DiceBear is an avatar library for designers and developers. Prior to version 9.4.0, the `ensureSize()` function in `@dicebear/converter` read the `width` and `height` attributes from the input SVG to determine the output canvas size for rasterization (PNG, JPEG, WebP, AVIF). An attacker who can supply a crafted SVG with extremely large dimensions (e.g. `width=&amp;#34;999999999&amp;#34;`) could force the server to allocate excessive memory, leading to denial of service. This primarily affects server-side applications that pass untrusted or user-supplied SVGs to the converter&amp;#39;s `toPng()`, `toJpeg()`, `toWebp()`, or `toAvif()` functions. Applications that only convert self-generated DiceBear avatars are not practically exploitable, but are still recommended to upgrade. This is fixed in version 9.4.0. The `ensureSize()` function no longer reads SVG attributes to determine output size. Instead, a new `size` option (default: 512, max: 2048) controls the output dimensions. Invalid values (NaN, negative, zero, Infinity) fall back to the default. If upgrading is not immediately possible, validate and sanitize the `width` and `height` attributes of any untrusted SVG input before passing it to the converter.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; dicebear&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DiceBear is an avatar library for designers and developers. Prior to version 9.4.0, the `ensureSize()` function in `@dicebear/converter` read the `width` and `height` attributes from the input SVG to determine the output canvas size for rasterization (PNG, JPEG, WebP, AVIF). An attacker who can supply a crafted SVG with extremely large dimensions (e.g. `width=&amp;#34;999999999&amp;#34;`) could force the server to allocate excessive memory, leading to denial of service. This primarily affects server-side applications that pass untrusted or user-supplied SVGs to the converter&amp;#39;s `toPng()`, `toJpeg()`, `toWebp()`, or `toAvif()` functions. Applications that only convert self-generated DiceBear avatars are not practically exploitable, but are still recommended to upgrade. This is fixed in version 9.4.0. The `ensureSize()` function no longer reads SVG attributes to determine output size. Instead, a new `size` option (default: 512, max: 2048) controls the output dimensions. Invalid values (NaN, negative, zero, Infinity) fall back to the default. If upgrading is not immediately possible, validate and sanitize the `width` and `height` attributes of any untrusted SVG input before passing it to the converter.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-29112</guid>
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