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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 13:47:11 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2023-46836 — x86: BTC/SRSO fixes not fully effective</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2023-46836</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Xen&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fixes for XSA-422 (Branch Type Confusion) and XSA-434 (Speculative
Return Stack Overflow) are not IRQ-safe.  It was believed that the
mitigations always operated in contexts with IRQs disabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the original XSA-254 fix for Meltdown (XPTI) deliberately left
interrupts enabled on two entry paths; one unconditionally, and one
conditionally on whether XPTI was active.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As BTC/SRSO and Meltdown affect different CPU vendors, the mitigations
are not active together by default.  Therefore, there is a race
condition whereby a malicious PV guest can bypass BTC/SRSO protections
and launch a BTC/SRSO attack against Xen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Xen&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fixes for XSA-422 (Branch Type Confusion) and XSA-434 (Speculative
Return Stack Overflow) are not IRQ-safe.  It was believed that the
mitigations always operated in contexts with IRQs disabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the original XSA-254 fix for Meltdown (XPTI) deliberately left
interrupts enabled on two entry paths; one unconditionally, and one
conditionally on whether XPTI was active.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As BTC/SRSO and Meltdown affect different CPU vendors, the mitigations
are not active together by default.  Therefore, there is a race
condition whereby a malicious PV guest can bypass BTC/SRSO protections
and launch a BTC/SRSO attack against Xen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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