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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 03:24:36 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2025-57801 — gnark is vulnerable to signature malleability in EdDSA and ECDSA due to missing scalar checks</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-57801</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Consensys gnark&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;gnark is a zero-knowledge proof system framework. In versions prior to 0.14.0, the Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go used the S value from a signature without asserting that 0 ≤ S &amp;lt; order, leading to a signature malleability vulnerability. Because gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from R and S, this enables signature malleability and may allow double spending. This issue has been addressed in version 0.14.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Consensys gnark&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;gnark is a zero-knowledge proof system framework. In versions prior to 0.14.0, the Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go used the S value from a signature without asserting that 0 ≤ S &amp;lt; order, leading to a signature malleability vulnerability. Because gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from R and S, this enables signature malleability and may allow double spending. This issue has been addressed in version 0.14.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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