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      <title>CVE-2025-53104 — gluestack-ui Command Injection Vulnerability via discussion-to-slack GitHub Action Workflow</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-53104</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; gluestack-ui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;gluestack-ui is a library of copy-pasteable components &amp;amp; patterns crafted with Tailwind CSS (NativeWind). Prior to commit e6b4271, a command injection vulnerability was discovered in the discussion-to-slack.yml GitHub Actions workflow. Untrusted discussion fields (title, body, etc.) were directly interpolated into shell commands in a run: block. An attacker could craft a malicious GitHub Discussion title or body (e.g., $(curl ...)) to execute arbitrary shell commands on the Actions runner. This issue has been fixed in commit e6b4271 where the discussion-to-slack.yml workflow was removed. Users should remove the discussion-to-slack.yml workflow if using a fork or derivative of this repository.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; gluestack-ui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;gluestack-ui is a library of copy-pasteable components &amp;amp; patterns crafted with Tailwind CSS (NativeWind). Prior to commit e6b4271, a command injection vulnerability was discovered in the discussion-to-slack.yml GitHub Actions workflow. Untrusted discussion fields (title, body, etc.) were directly interpolated into shell commands in a run: block. An attacker could craft a malicious GitHub Discussion title or body (e.g., $(curl ...)) to execute arbitrary shell commands on the Actions runner. This issue has been fixed in commit e6b4271 where the discussion-to-slack.yml workflow was removed. Users should remove the discussion-to-slack.yml workflow if using a fork or derivative of this repository.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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