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      <title>CVE-2021-21249 — Post-Auth Unsafe Yaml deserialization</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2021-21249</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; theonedev onedev&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OneDev is an all-in-one devops platform. In OneDev before version 4.0.3, there is an issue involving YAML parsing which can lead to post-auth remote code execution. In order to parse and process YAML files, OneDev uses SnakeYaml which by default (when not using `SafeConstructor`) allows the instantiation of arbitrary classes. We can leverage that to run arbitrary code by instantiating classes such as `javax.script.ScriptEngineManager` and using `URLClassLoader` to load the script engine provider, resulting in the instantiation of a user controlled class. For a full example refer to the referenced GHSA. This issue was addressed in 4.0.3 by only allowing certain known classes to be deserialized&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; theonedev onedev&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OneDev is an all-in-one devops platform. In OneDev before version 4.0.3, there is an issue involving YAML parsing which can lead to post-auth remote code execution. In order to parse and process YAML files, OneDev uses SnakeYaml which by default (when not using `SafeConstructor`) allows the instantiation of arbitrary classes. We can leverage that to run arbitrary code by instantiating classes such as `javax.script.ScriptEngineManager` and using `URLClassLoader` to load the script engine provider, resulting in the instantiation of a user controlled class. For a full example refer to the referenced GHSA. This issue was addressed in 4.0.3 by only allowing certain known classes to be deserialized&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2021-21249</guid>
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