<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 22:15:48 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2024-53267 — Vulnerability with bundle verification in sigstore-java</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-53267</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; sigstore-java&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sigstore-java is a sigstore java client for interacting with sigstore infrastructure. sigstore-java has insufficient verification for a situation where a validly-signed but &amp;#34;mismatched&amp;#34; bundle is presented as proof of inclusion into a transparency log. This bug impacts clients using any variation of KeylessVerifier.verify(). The verifier may accept a bundle with an unrelated log entry, cryptographically verifying everything but fails to ensure the log entry applies to the artifact in question, thereby &amp;#34;verifying&amp;#34; a bundle without any proof the signing event was logged. This allows the creation of a bundle without fulcio certificate and private key combined with an unrelated but time-correct log entry to fake logging of a signing event. A malicious actor using a compromised identity may want to do this to prevent discovery via rekor&amp;#39;s log monitors. The signer&amp;#39;s identity will still be available to the verifier. The signature on the bundle must still be on the correct artifact for the verifier to pass. sigstore-gradle-plugin and sigstore-maven-plugin are not affected by this as they only provide signing functionality. This issue has been patched in v1.1.0 release with PR #856. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; sigstore-java&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sigstore-java is a sigstore java client for interacting with sigstore infrastructure. sigstore-java has insufficient verification for a situation where a validly-signed but &amp;#34;mismatched&amp;#34; bundle is presented as proof of inclusion into a transparency log. This bug impacts clients using any variation of KeylessVerifier.verify(). The verifier may accept a bundle with an unrelated log entry, cryptographically verifying everything but fails to ensure the log entry applies to the artifact in question, thereby &amp;#34;verifying&amp;#34; a bundle without any proof the signing event was logged. This allows the creation of a bundle without fulcio certificate and private key combined with an unrelated but time-correct log entry to fake logging of a signing event. A malicious actor using a compromised identity may want to do this to prevent discovery via rekor&amp;#39;s log monitors. The signer&amp;#39;s identity will still be available to the verifier. The signature on the bundle must still be on the correct artifact for the verifier to pass. sigstore-gradle-plugin and sigstore-maven-plugin are not affected by this as they only provide signing functionality. This issue has been patched in v1.1.0 release with PR #856. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-53267</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
