https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 07 Oct 2026 16:25:51 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-45311 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> quinn-rs quinn, quinn_project quinn</p> <p>Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server&#39;s `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn&#39;t exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> quinn-rs quinn, quinn_project quinn</p> <p>Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server&#39;s `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn&#39;t exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-45311