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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 10:33:14 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-99018</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-99018</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-99018</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1537 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un a…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1537</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1537</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1537</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-392034</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-392034</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-392034</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-392034</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-99018</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99018</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, handle_exception() reloads the kernel
shadow call stack pointer (gp) only when the trap came from userspace.
It made that decision with scs_load_current_if_task_changed, which
compares the trap-time tp (read back from sscratch into s5) against the
current tp:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;beq	\prev, tp, _skip_scs
	scs_load_current
_skip_scs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tp is a user-writable register.  A user task that sets tp to the
linear-map address of its own task_struct (&amp;amp;current) before trapping
makes the comparison succeed (can achieve by brute force with KASLR
enable under our test), so the kernel skips scs_load_current and
keeps running with the gp that userspace left in place.  Under
CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK gp is the shadow call stack pointer and
load_global_pointer is a no-op, so the compiler-emitted
&amp;#34;sd ra, -8(gp)&amp;#34; / &amp;#34;ld ra, -8(gp)&amp;#34; in every non-leaf function then write
to, and return through, an attacker-controlled address -- an
unprivileged kernel arbitrary-write and control-flow-hijack primitive.
The poisoned gp is saved to task_struct.scs_sp on return, so the reload
is skipped on every subsequent entry as well.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Decide &amp;#34;came from userspace&amp;#34; from the hardware sstatus.SPP bit (already
in s1 at this point) instead of from tp, mirroring the check that
ret_from_exception already uses a few instructions later.  SPP is
written by hardware on trap entry a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, handle_exception() reloads the kernel
shadow call stack pointer (gp) only when the trap came from userspace.
It made that decision with scs_load_current_if_task_changed, which
compares the trap-time tp (read back from sscratch into s5) against the
current tp:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;beq	\prev, tp, _skip_scs
	scs_load_current
_skip_scs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tp is a user-writable register.  A user task that sets tp to the
linear-map address of its own task_struct (&amp;amp;current) before trapping
makes the comparison succeed (can achieve by brute force with KASLR
enable under our test), so the kernel skips scs_load_current and
keeps running with the gp that userspace left in place.  Under
CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK gp is the shadow call stack pointer and
load_global_pointer is a no-op, so the compiler-emitted
&amp;#34;sd ra, -8(gp)&amp;#34; / &amp;#34;ld ra, -8(gp)&amp;#34; in every non-leaf function then write
to, and return through, an attacker-controlled address -- an
unprivileged kernel arbitrary-write and control-flow-hijack primitive.
The poisoned gp is saved to task_struct.scs_sp on return, so the reload
is skipped on every subsequent entry as well.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Decide &amp;#34;came from userspace&amp;#34; from the hardware sstatus.SPP bit (already
in s1 at this point) instead of from tp, mirroring the check that
ret_from_exception already uses a few instructions later.  SPP is
written by hardware on trap entry a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99018</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7x79-hrpm-vw9w</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7x79-hrpm-vw9w</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, handle_exception() reloads the kernel
shadow call stack pointer (gp) only when the trap came from userspace.
It made that decision with scs_load_current_if_task_changed, which
compares the trap-time tp (read back from sscratch into s5) against the
current tp:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;beq	\prev, tp, _skip_scs
	scs_load_current
_skip_scs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tp is a user-writable register.  A user task that sets tp to the
linear-map address of its own task_struct (&amp;amp;current) before trapping
makes the comparison succeed (can achieve by brute force with KASLR
enable under our test), so the kernel skips scs_load_current and
keeps running with the gp that userspace left in place.  Under
CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK gp is the shadow call stack pointer and
load_global_pointer is a no-op, so the compiler-emitted
&amp;#34;sd ra, -8(gp)&amp;#34; / &amp;#34;ld ra, -8(gp)&amp;#34; in every non-leaf function then write
to, and return through, an attacker-controlled address -- an
unprivileged kernel arbitrary-write and control-flow-hijack primitive.
The poisoned gp is saved to task_struct.scs_sp on return, so the reload
is skipped on every subsequent entry as well.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Decide &amp;#34;came from userspace&amp;#34; from the hardware sstatus.SPP bit (already
in s1 at this point) instead of from tp, mirroring the check that
ret_from_exception already uses a few instructions later.  SPP is
written by hardware on trap entry a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, handle_exception() reloads the kernel
shadow call stack pointer (gp) only when the trap came from userspace.
It made that decision with scs_load_current_if_task_changed, which
compares the trap-time tp (read back from sscratch into s5) against the
current tp:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;beq	\prev, tp, _skip_scs
	scs_load_current
_skip_scs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tp is a user-writable register.  A user task that sets tp to the
linear-map address of its own task_struct (&amp;amp;current) before trapping
makes the comparison succeed (can achieve by brute force with KASLR
enable under our test), so the kernel skips scs_load_current and
keeps running with the gp that userspace left in place.  Under
CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK gp is the shadow call stack pointer and
load_global_pointer is a no-op, so the compiler-emitted
&amp;#34;sd ra, -8(gp)&amp;#34; / &amp;#34;ld ra, -8(gp)&amp;#34; in every non-leaf function then write
to, and return through, an attacker-controlled address -- an
unprivileged kernel arbitrary-write and control-flow-hijack primitive.
The poisoned gp is saved to task_struct.scs_sp on return, so the reload
is skipped on every subsequent entry as well.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Decide &amp;#34;came from userspace&amp;#34; from the hardware sstatus.SPP bit (already
in s1 at this point) instead of from tp, mirroring the check that
ret_from_exception already uses a few instructions later.  SPP is
written by hardware on trap entry a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7x79-hrpm-vw9w</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-99018 — riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99018</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-99018</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99018</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-99018</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-99018</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 164 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, handle_exception() reloads the kernel shadow call stack pointer (gp) only when the trap came from userspace. It made that decision with scs_load_current_if_task_changed, which compares the trap-time tp (read back from sscratch into s5) against the current tp: 	beq	\prev, tp, _skip_scs 	scs_load_current _skip_scs: tp is a user-writable register.  A user task that sets tp to the linear-map address of its own task_struct (&amp;amp;current) before trapping makes the comparison succeed (can achieve by brute force with KASLR enable under our test), so the kernel skips scs_load_current and keeps running with the gp that userspace left in place.  Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK gp is the shadow call stack pointer and load_global_pointer is a no-op, so the compiler-emitted &amp;#34;sd ra, -8(gp)&amp;#34; / &amp;#34;ld ra, -8(gp)&amp;#34; in every non-leaf function then write to, and return through, an attacker-controlled address -- an unprivileged kernel arbitrary-write and control-flow-hijack primitive. The poisoned gp is saved to task_struct.scs_sp on return, so the reload is skipped on every subsequent entry as well. Decide &amp;#34;came from userspace&amp;#34; from the hardware sstatus.SPP bit (already in s1 at this point) instead of from tp, mirroring the check that ret_from_exception already uses a few instructions later.  SPP is written by hardware on trap entry and ca…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 164 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, handle_exception() reloads the kernel shadow call stack pointer (gp) only when the trap came from userspace. It made that decision with scs_load_current_if_task_changed, which compares the trap-time tp (read back from sscratch into s5) against the current tp: 	beq	\prev, tp, _skip_scs 	scs_load_current _skip_scs: tp is a user-writable register.  A user task that sets tp to the linear-map address of its own task_struct (&amp;amp;current) before trapping makes the comparison succeed (can achieve by brute force with KASLR enable under our test), so the kernel skips scs_load_current and keeps running with the gp that userspace left in place.  Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK gp is the shadow call stack pointer and load_global_pointer is a no-op, so the compiler-emitted &amp;#34;sd ra, -8(gp)&amp;#34; / &amp;#34;ld ra, -8(gp)&amp;#34; in every non-leaf function then write to, and return through, an attacker-controlled address -- an unprivileged kernel arbitrary-write and control-flow-hijack primitive. The poisoned gp is saved to task_struct.scs_sp on return, so the reload is skipped on every subsequent entry as well. Decide &amp;#34;came from userspace&amp;#34; from the hardware sstatus.SPP bit (already in s1 at this point) instead of from tp, mirroring the check that ret_from_exception already uses a few instructions later.  SPP is written by hardware on trap entry and ca…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-99018</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4152 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4152</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4152</guid>
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