Most recent entries from all

BELL-CVE-2026-98276

Affected: Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts

EUVD-2026-383388

fkie_cve-2026-98276

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: lock the socket in sock_gettstamp()

sk->sk_flags must only be changed while holding the socket lock, because sock_set_flag() and sock_reset_flag() use non atomic operations (__set_bit() and __clear_bit()).

sock_gettstamp() is one of the last places where a bit of sk->sk_flags is changed from a syscall without owning the socket lock, through sock_enable_timestamp(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMP).

sk_set_memalloc() and sk_clear_memalloc() also change sk->sk_flags without the socket lock, but their callers (nbd, iscsi_tcp, nvme-tcp, sunrpc, wireguard) need a careful audit, this will be addressed in a separate patch.

Jungwoo Lee and Wongi Lee reported an UDP socket use-after-free caused by this bug: a SIOCGSTAMPNS_NEW ioctl racing with bind() can cancel the SOCK_RCU_FREE bit that udp_lib_get_port() just set, because both threads perform a read-modify-write on the same word.

CPU 0 (bind) CPU 1 (SIOCGSTAMPNS_NEW) -------------------------------- ---------------------------- read sk_flags = F read sk_flags = F compute F | BIT(SOCK_RCU_FREE) compute F | BIT(SOCK_TIMESTAMP) store F | BIT(SOCK_RCU_FREE) sk_add_node_rcu(sk, ...) store F | BIT(SOCK_TIMESTAMP)

After the lost update, SOCK_RCU_FREE is clear while the socket is visible to lockless UDP receive lookups. sk_destruct() then frees the socket immediately instead of w…

GHSA-qgp7-2j87-wmwc

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: lock the socket in sock_gettstamp()

sk->sk_flags must only be changed while holding the socket lock, because sock_set_flag() and sock_reset_flag() use non atomic operations (__set_bit() and __clear_bit()).

sock_gettstamp() is one of the last places where a bit of sk->sk_flags is changed from a syscall without owning the socket lock, through sock_enable_timestamp(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMP).

After the lost update, SOCK_RCU_FREE is clear while the socket is visible to lockless UDP receive lookups. sk_destruct() then frees the socket immediately instead of w…

msrc_CVE-2026-98276 — net: lock the socket in sock_gettstamp()

msrc_CVE-2026-98276

UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98276

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 247 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: lock the socket in sock_gettstamp() sk->sk_flags must only be changed while holding the socket lock, because sock_set_flag() and sock_reset_flag() use non atomic operations (__set_bit() and __clear_bit()). sock_gettstamp() is one of the last places where a bit of sk->sk_flags is changed from a syscall without owning the socket lock, through sock_enable_timestamp(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMP). sk_set_memalloc() and sk_clear_memalloc() also change sk->sk_flags without the socket lock, but their callers (nbd, iscsi_tcp, nvme-tcp, sunrpc, wireguard) need a careful audit, this will be addressed in a separate patch. Jungwoo Lee and Wongi Lee reported an UDP socket use-after-free caused by this bug: a SIOCGSTAMPNS_NEW ioctl racing with bind() can cancel the SOCK_RCU_FREE bit that udp_lib_get_port() just set, because both threads perform a read-modify-write on the same word. CPU 0 (bind) CPU 1 (SIOCGSTAMPNS_NEW) -------------------------------- ---------------------------- read sk_flags = F read sk_flags = F compute F | BIT(SOCK_RCU_FREE) compute F | BIT(SOCK_TIMESTAMP) store F | BIT(SOCK_RCU_FREE) sk_add_node_rcu(sk, ...) store F | BIT(SOCK_TIMESTAMP) After the lost update, SOCK_RCU_FREE is clear while the socket is visible to lockless UDP receive lookups. sk_destruct() then frees the socket immediately instead of waiting…