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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 14:05:16 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-98234</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-98234</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-98234</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-383346</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-383346</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-383346</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-383346</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98234</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98234</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/sched: hhf: cap hh_flows_limit at change time&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hhf_change() stores TCA_HHF_HH_FLOWS_LIMIT with no upper bound. A huge
hh_flows_limit lets each new heavy-hitter flow pass the
hh_flows_current_cnt check in alloc_new_hh() and forces a fixed-size
kzalloc(GFP_ATOMIC) per flow under spoofed traffic, for unbounded memory
growth.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bound the attribute with NLA_POLICY_MAX() at 2*HH_FLOWS_CNT (the
hhf_init() default) and report the rejected value via extack. The
deprecated nested parse is kept: legacy tc does not set NLA_F_NESTED on
TCA_OPTIONS. Configs relying on hh_limit above the default were relying
on unbounded, unsafe behaviour and are not supported going forward.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hhf_init() also ran hhf_change() before setting the default
hh_flows_limit, so a user-supplied hh_limit at add time was clobbered
back to 2048. Set the default before hhf_change() so the configured
value sticks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a follow-up to commit eb56a495f59b (&amp;#34;net/sched: hhf: clamp
quantum in change and init paths&amp;#34;), which bounded the quantum of the
same qdisc; the hh_flows_limit bound is the remaining unbounded knob of
that series&amp;#39; scope.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Conditions to recreate the bug: CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace;
tc qdisc change dev X root hhf hh_limit 4294967295 succeeds and the
value is echoed by tc qdisc show, unbounding heavy-hitter flow
allocations; also tc qdisc add dev X root hhf hh_limit 500 stores 2048
instead of 500.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/sched: hhf: cap hh_flows_limit at change time&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hhf_change() stores TCA_HHF_HH_FLOWS_LIMIT with no upper bound. A huge
hh_flows_limit lets each new heavy-hitter flow pass the
hh_flows_current_cnt check in alloc_new_hh() and forces a fixed-size
kzalloc(GFP_ATOMIC) per flow under spoofed traffic, for unbounded memory
growth.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bound the attribute with NLA_POLICY_MAX() at 2*HH_FLOWS_CNT (the
hhf_init() default) and report the rejected value via extack. The
deprecated nested parse is kept: legacy tc does not set NLA_F_NESTED on
TCA_OPTIONS. Configs relying on hh_limit above the default were relying
on unbounded, unsafe behaviour and are not supported going forward.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hhf_init() also ran hhf_change() before setting the default
hh_flows_limit, so a user-supplied hh_limit at add time was clobbered
back to 2048. Set the default before hhf_change() so the configured
value sticks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a follow-up to commit eb56a495f59b (&amp;#34;net/sched: hhf: clamp
quantum in change and init paths&amp;#34;), which bounded the quantum of the
same qdisc; the hh_flows_limit bound is the remaining unbounded knob of
that series&amp;#39; scope.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Conditions to recreate the bug: CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace;
tc qdisc change dev X root hhf hh_limit 4294967295 succeeds and the
value is echoed by tc qdisc show, unbounding heavy-hitter flow
allocations; also tc qdisc add dev X root hhf hh_limit 500 stores 2048
instead of 500.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98234</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qgx8-c46g-4vmq</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qgx8-c46g-4vmq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/sched: hhf: cap hh_flows_limit at change time&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hhf_change() stores TCA_HHF_HH_FLOWS_LIMIT with no upper bound. A huge
hh_flows_limit lets each new heavy-hitter flow pass the
hh_flows_current_cnt check in alloc_new_hh() and forces a fixed-size
kzalloc(GFP_ATOMIC) per flow under spoofed traffic, for unbounded memory
growth.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bound the attribute with NLA_POLICY_MAX() at 2*HH_FLOWS_CNT (the
hhf_init() default) and report the rejected value via extack. The
deprecated nested parse is kept: legacy tc does not set NLA_F_NESTED on
TCA_OPTIONS. Configs relying on hh_limit above the default were relying
on unbounded, unsafe behaviour and are not supported going forward.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hhf_init() also ran hhf_change() before setting the default
hh_flows_limit, so a user-supplied hh_limit at add time was clobbered
back to 2048. Set the default before hhf_change() so the configured
value sticks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a follow-up to commit eb56a495f59b (&amp;#34;net/sched: hhf: clamp
quantum in change and init paths&amp;#34;), which bounded the quantum of the
same qdisc; the hh_flows_limit bound is the remaining unbounded knob of
that series&amp;#39; scope.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Conditions to recreate the bug: CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace;
tc qdisc change dev X root hhf hh_limit 4294967295 succeeds and the
value is echoed by tc qdisc show, unbounding heavy-hitter flow
allocations; also tc qdisc add dev X root hhf hh_limit 500 stores 2048
instead of 500.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/sched: hhf: cap hh_flows_limit at change time&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hhf_change() stores TCA_HHF_HH_FLOWS_LIMIT with no upper bound. A huge
hh_flows_limit lets each new heavy-hitter flow pass the
hh_flows_current_cnt check in alloc_new_hh() and forces a fixed-size
kzalloc(GFP_ATOMIC) per flow under spoofed traffic, for unbounded memory
growth.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bound the attribute with NLA_POLICY_MAX() at 2*HH_FLOWS_CNT (the
hhf_init() default) and report the rejected value via extack. The
deprecated nested parse is kept: legacy tc does not set NLA_F_NESTED on
TCA_OPTIONS. Configs relying on hh_limit above the default were relying
on unbounded, unsafe behaviour and are not supported going forward.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hhf_init() also ran hhf_change() before setting the default
hh_flows_limit, so a user-supplied hh_limit at add time was clobbered
back to 2048. Set the default before hhf_change() so the configured
value sticks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a follow-up to commit eb56a495f59b (&amp;#34;net/sched: hhf: clamp
quantum in change and init paths&amp;#34;), which bounded the quantum of the
same qdisc; the hh_flows_limit bound is the remaining unbounded knob of
that series&amp;#39; scope.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Conditions to recreate the bug: CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace;
tc qdisc change dev X root hhf hh_limit 4294967295 succeeds and the
value is echoed by tc qdisc show, unbounding heavy-hitter flow
allocations; also tc qdisc add dev X root hhf hh_limit 500 stores 2048
instead of 500.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qgx8-c46g-4vmq</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-98234 — net/sched: hhf: cap hh_flows_limit at change time</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98234</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-98234</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98234</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98234</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98234</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: hhf: cap hh_flows_limit at change time hhf_change() stores TCA_HHF_HH_FLOWS_LIMIT with no upper bound. A huge hh_flows_limit lets each new heavy-hitter flow pass the hh_flows_current_cnt check in alloc_new_hh() and forces a fixed-size kzalloc(GFP_ATOMIC) per flow under spoofed traffic, for unbounded memory growth. Bound the attribute with NLA_POLICY_MAX() at 2*HH_FLOWS_CNT (the hhf_init() default) and report the rejected value via extack. The deprecated nested parse is kept: legacy tc does not set NLA_F_NESTED on TCA_OPTIONS. Configs relying on hh_limit above the default were relying on unbounded, unsafe behaviour and are not supported going forward. hhf_init() also ran hhf_change() before setting the default hh_flows_limit, so a user-supplied hh_limit at add time was clobbered back to 2048. Set the default before hhf_change() so the configured value sticks. This is a follow-up to commit eb56a495f59b (&amp;#34;net/sched: hhf: clamp quantum in change and init paths&amp;#34;), which bounded the quantum of the same qdisc; the hh_flows_limit bound is the remaining unbounded knob of that series&amp;#39; scope. Conditions to recreate the bug: CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace; tc qdisc change dev X root hhf hh_limit 4294967295 succeeds and the value is echoed by tc qdisc show, unbounding heavy-hitter flow allocations; also tc qdisc add dev X root hhf hh_limit 500 stores 2048 instead of 500.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: hhf: cap hh_flows_limit at change time hhf_change() stores TCA_HHF_HH_FLOWS_LIMIT with no upper bound. A huge hh_flows_limit lets each new heavy-hitter flow pass the hh_flows_current_cnt check in alloc_new_hh() and forces a fixed-size kzalloc(GFP_ATOMIC) per flow under spoofed traffic, for unbounded memory growth. Bound the attribute with NLA_POLICY_MAX() at 2*HH_FLOWS_CNT (the hhf_init() default) and report the rejected value via extack. The deprecated nested parse is kept: legacy tc does not set NLA_F_NESTED on TCA_OPTIONS. Configs relying on hh_limit above the default were relying on unbounded, unsafe behaviour and are not supported going forward. hhf_init() also ran hhf_change() before setting the default hh_flows_limit, so a user-supplied hh_limit at add time was clobbered back to 2048. Set the default before hhf_change() so the configured value sticks. This is a follow-up to commit eb56a495f59b (&amp;#34;net/sched: hhf: clamp quantum in change and init paths&amp;#34;), which bounded the quantum of the same qdisc; the hh_flows_limit bound is the remaining unbounded knob of that series&amp;#39; scope. Conditions to recreate the bug: CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace; tc qdisc change dev X root hhf hh_limit 4294967295 succeeds and the value is echoed by tc qdisc show, unbounding heavy-hitter flow allocations; also tc qdisc add dev X root hhf hh_limit 500 stores 2048 instead of 500.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98234</guid>
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