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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-399779</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-399779</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-399779</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-399779</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-95860</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-95860</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;node-opcua is an OPC UA implementation for TypeScript and Node.js. From 2.42.0 until 2.180.0, namespace-level access control configured through setDefaultRolePermissions is not honored by the runtime enforcement path for nodes without explicit per-node RolePermissions. SessionContext.getApplicableRolePermissions reads a missing or null DefaultRolePermissions metadata value instead of the configured namespace field, and the null result is treated permissively. An anonymous network client can consequently write variables with CurrentWrite access or call bound methods when an operator configured a restrictive namespace default and relied on inheritance. Servers with no declared policy, nodes with explicit per-node permissions, and correctly bound programmatic namespace metadata are outside the authorization-bypass case. This issue is fixed in version 2.180.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;node-opcua is an OPC UA implementation for TypeScript and Node.js. From 2.42.0 until 2.180.0, namespace-level access control configured through setDefaultRolePermissions is not honored by the runtime enforcement path for nodes without explicit per-node RolePermissions. SessionContext.getApplicableRolePermissions reads a missing or null DefaultRolePermissions metadata value instead of the configured namespace field, and the null result is treated permissively. An anonymous network client can consequently write variables with CurrentWrite access or call bound methods when an operator configured a restrictive namespace default and relied on inheritance. Servers with no declared policy, nodes with explicit per-node permissions, and correctly bound programmatic namespace metadata are outside the authorization-bypass case. This issue is fixed in version 2.180.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-95860</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-xggf-m53x-jc3f — node-opcua: Namespace-Level RBAC Fail-Open - Anonymous Write/Call Bypass via Unbound `DefaultRolePermissions</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xggf-m53x-jc3f</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: node-opcua, npm: node-opcua-address-space, npm: node-opcua-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated (**Anonymous**) client can **Write** protected Variables and **Call** privileged Methods on any Node that lacks explicit per-node permissions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This follows the inheritance model defined by OPC UA Part 3, §5.2.9, where nodes without an explicit `RolePermissions` attribute inherit the namespace `DefaultRolePermissions`. OPC 10000-3 §4.8.3 mandates a **default-deny** evaluation (`Bad_UserAccessDenied` when the operation bits are not set); `node-opcua` instead **grants all permissions**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The root cause is a combination of an authorization **fail-open** and a **disconnect** between the configuration API and the runtime enforcement path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected configuration
This advisory covers two cases that are not equally severe:
1. No RolePermissions declared anywhere - resolution is permissive. This is node-opcua&amp;#39;s documented behaviour for a server with no access control configured, so nothing is being bypassed. Worth fixing as an insecure default (CWE-1188), but it is not the 9.1 bypass. Stock Opc.Ua.NodeSet2.xml ships DefaultRolePermissions with no Value, so a server that declared no policy is NOT exposed.
2. A policy is declared and silently ignored - setDefaultRolePermissions() succeeds and does nothing, so an operator who believes they locked the namespace down has not. This is the real bypass and this is what earns CVSS 9.1. It requires that someone declared a namespace default.
Everything below describes case 2 unless stated otherwise.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;##…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: node-opcua, npm: node-opcua-address-space, npm: node-opcua-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated (**Anonymous**) client can **Write** protected Variables and **Call** privileged Methods on any Node that lacks explicit per-node permissions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This follows the inheritance model defined by OPC UA Part 3, §5.2.9, where nodes without an explicit `RolePermissions` attribute inherit the namespace `DefaultRolePermissions`. OPC 10000-3 §4.8.3 mandates a **default-deny** evaluation (`Bad_UserAccessDenied` when the operation bits are not set); `node-opcua` instead **grants all permissions**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The root cause is a combination of an authorization **fail-open** and a **disconnect** between the configuration API and the runtime enforcement path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected configuration
This advisory covers two cases that are not equally severe:
1. No RolePermissions declared anywhere - resolution is permissive. This is node-opcua&amp;#39;s documented behaviour for a server with no access control configured, so nothing is being bypassed. Worth fixing as an insecure default (CWE-1188), but it is not the 9.1 bypass. Stock Opc.Ua.NodeSet2.xml ships DefaultRolePermissions with no Value, so a server that declared no policy is NOT exposed.
2. A policy is declared and silently ignored - setDefaultRolePermissions() succeeds and does nothing, so an operator who believes they locked the namespace down has not. This is the real bypass and this is what earns CVSS 9.1. It requires that someone declared a namespace default.
Everything below describes case 2 unless stated otherwise.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;##…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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