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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-339780</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339780</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-339780</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339780</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-9058</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-9058</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;For untrusted certificates that contain the &amp;#34;Authority Information Access - caIssuers URI&amp;#34; extension, Szafir SDK will automatically download the parent CA certificate from the specified URL and will import it to its trust store as a &amp;#34;nonqualified&amp;#34; certificate. In such a case, Szafir SDK returns a success status code of 0 (&amp;#34;Positively verified&amp;#34;) upon successful cryptographic verification and a certificate status of &amp;#34;nonqualified&amp;#34;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For other types of untrusted certificates, Szafir SDK returns a success status code of 0 (&amp;#34;Positively verified&amp;#34;) upon successful cryptographic verification and a certificate status of &amp;#34;nondetermined&amp;#34;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This may lead integrating applications to incorrectly treat the digital signature as valid despite an untrusted certificate chain. This flaw enables authentication bypass and user impersonation:
(1) in use-cases other than qualified certificate authentication, or
(2) if the qualified certificate authentication use-case is not correctly implemented by the integrating application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue was fixed in version 1.8.463.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;For untrusted certificates that contain the &amp;#34;Authority Information Access - caIssuers URI&amp;#34; extension, Szafir SDK will automatically download the parent CA certificate from the specified URL and will import it to its trust store as a &amp;#34;nonqualified&amp;#34; certificate. In such a case, Szafir SDK returns a success status code of 0 (&amp;#34;Positively verified&amp;#34;) upon successful cryptographic verification and a certificate status of &amp;#34;nonqualified&amp;#34;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For other types of untrusted certificates, Szafir SDK returns a success status code of 0 (&amp;#34;Positively verified&amp;#34;) upon successful cryptographic verification and a certificate status of &amp;#34;nondetermined&amp;#34;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This may lead integrating applications to incorrectly treat the digital signature as valid despite an untrusted certificate chain. This flaw enables authentication bypass and user impersonation:
(1) in use-cases other than qualified certificate authentication, or
(2) if the qualified certificate authentication use-case is not correctly implemented by the integrating application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue was fixed in version 1.8.463.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-9058</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7hq7-5m7p-r2pp</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7hq7-5m7p-r2pp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Szafir SDK returns a success status code from the cryptographic digital signature verification process (i.e. /VerifyingTaskItem/Signature/VerificationResult/Result/@code == 0, &amp;#34;Positively verified&amp;#34;) even when the trust status of the signer&amp;#39;s certificate could not be established (i.e. /VerifyingTaskItem/Signature/VerificationResult/SigningCertificate/@certificateType == &amp;#34;nondetermined&amp;#34;). This causes consuming applications to incorrectly treat the signature as valid despite an unverified certificate chain, enabling authentication bypass and user impersonation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue was fixed in version 463.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Szafir SDK returns a success status code from the cryptographic digital signature verification process (i.e. /VerifyingTaskItem/Signature/VerificationResult/Result/@code == 0, &amp;#34;Positively verified&amp;#34;) even when the trust status of the signer&amp;#39;s certificate could not be established (i.e. /VerifyingTaskItem/Signature/VerificationResult/SigningCertificate/@certificateType == &amp;#34;nondetermined&amp;#34;). This causes consuming applications to incorrectly treat the signature as valid despite an unverified certificate chain, enabling authentication bypass and user impersonation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue was fixed in version 463.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7hq7-5m7p-r2pp</guid>
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