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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-365327</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-365327</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-365327</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-365327</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-86304</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-86304</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;parse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST-&amp;gt;new with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion-&amp;gt;new_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;parse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST-&amp;gt;new with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion-&amp;gt;new_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-86304</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-34pg-3x4x-4vf5</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-34pg-3x4x-4vf5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;parse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST-&amp;gt;new with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion-&amp;gt;new_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;parse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST-&amp;gt;new with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion-&amp;gt;new_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-34pg-3x4x-4vf5</guid>
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