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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 02:52:46 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-400474</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-400474</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-400474</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-400474</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-86041</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-86041</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ezBookkeeping is an open source, self-hosted personal finance application. From 0.10.0 until 1.6.0, ezBookkeeping constructs its Gin router with gin.New() without configuring SetTrustedProxies, causing c.ClientIP() to trust a spoofed X-Forwarded-For value. An unauthenticated remote attacker can supply an allowlisted address to bypass the mcp_allowed_remote_ips or api_token_allowed_remote_ips gate. A valid MCP or API token remains required for protected actions. When such actions occur, the same spoofed value is stored in Transaction.CreatedIp and the request log, attributing activity to the trusted host instead of the attacker. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ezBookkeeping is an open source, self-hosted personal finance application. From 0.10.0 until 1.6.0, ezBookkeeping constructs its Gin router with gin.New() without configuring SetTrustedProxies, causing c.ClientIP() to trust a spoofed X-Forwarded-For value. An unauthenticated remote attacker can supply an allowlisted address to bypass the mcp_allowed_remote_ips or api_token_allowed_remote_ips gate. A valid MCP or API token remains required for protected actions. When such actions occur, the same spoofed value is stored in Transaction.CreatedIp and the request log, attributing activity to the trusted host instead of the attacker. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-86041</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wchh-mrv2-5h4q — ezBookkeeping: Source-IP allowlist (MCP &amp; API token) is bypassable via a spoofed `X-Forwarded-For` header</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wchh-mrv2-5h4q</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A remote attacker from any IP address defeats the operator-configured source-IP allowlist (`mcp_allowed_remote_ips` / `api_token_allowed_remote_ips`) by sending a single `X-Forwarded-For: &amp;lt;allowlisted-ip&amp;gt;` header. The router is created with `gin.New()` and never calls `SetTrustedProxies`, so gin trusts every proxy by default and `c.ClientIP()` returns the attacker-supplied header verbatim. The same forged value is also written to `Transaction.CreatedIp` and the access log, so the attacker&amp;#39;s real IP never appears in any record.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`cmd/webserver.go:104` builds the router with `gin.New()`. A grep of `cmd/` and `pkg/` confirms `SetTrustedProxies` is never called, leaving gin&amp;#39;s default trusted-proxy range of `0.0.0.0/0` and `::/0`. `WebContext` (`pkg/core/context_web.go:39`) embeds `*gin.Context` and does not override `ClientIP()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both allowlist middlewares match the operator allowlist against this attacker-controlled value:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// pkg/middlewares/mcp_server_ip_limit.go:19
if config.MCPAllowedRemoteIPs[i].Match(c.ClientIP()) { c.Next(); return }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The identical `c.ClientIP()` is consumed by the audit trail at `pkg/api/transactions.go:1078` (`createNewTransactionModel(..., c.ClientIP())` → `CreatedIp`) and the access log (`pkg/middlewares/request_log.go:28`), so one header both bypasses the gate and forges attribution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Runtime PoC (no live deployment required) — `pkg/middlewares/xff_bypass_runtime_test.go`, `pkg/middlewares/xff_chain_runtime…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A remote attacker from any IP address defeats the operator-configured source-IP allowlist (`mcp_allowed_remote_ips` / `api_token_allowed_remote_ips`) by sending a single `X-Forwarded-For: &amp;lt;allowlisted-ip&amp;gt;` header. The router is created with `gin.New()` and never calls `SetTrustedProxies`, so gin trusts every proxy by default and `c.ClientIP()` returns the attacker-supplied header verbatim. The same forged value is also written to `Transaction.CreatedIp` and the access log, so the attacker&amp;#39;s real IP never appears in any record.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`cmd/webserver.go:104` builds the router with `gin.New()`. A grep of `cmd/` and `pkg/` confirms `SetTrustedProxies` is never called, leaving gin&amp;#39;s default trusted-proxy range of `0.0.0.0/0` and `::/0`. `WebContext` (`pkg/core/context_web.go:39`) embeds `*gin.Context` and does not override `ClientIP()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both allowlist middlewares match the operator allowlist against this attacker-controlled value:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// pkg/middlewares/mcp_server_ip_limit.go:19
if config.MCPAllowedRemoteIPs[i].Match(c.ClientIP()) { c.Next(); return }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The identical `c.ClientIP()` is consumed by the audit trail at `pkg/api/transactions.go:1078` (`createNewTransactionModel(..., c.ClientIP())` → `CreatedIp`) and the access log (`pkg/middlewares/request_log.go:28`), so one header both bypasses the gate and forges attribution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Runtime PoC (no live deployment required) — `pkg/middlewares/xff_bypass_runtime_test.go`, `pkg/middlewares/xff_chain_runtime…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wchh-mrv2-5h4q</guid>
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