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EUVD-2026-322095

fkie_cve-2026-8469

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in phenixdigital phoenix_storybook allows unauthenticated denial-of-service via BEAM atom table exhaustion.

Multiple LiveView event handlers convert user-supplied event parameter strings to atoms using String.to_atom/1 without validation: 'Elixir.PhoenixStorybook.ExtraAssignsHelpers':handle_set_variation_assign/3 interns every key of the psb-assign params map; 'Elixir.PhoenixStorybook.ExtraAssignsHelpers':handle_toggle_variation_assign/3 interns the "attr" value from psb-toggle events; 'Elixir.PhoenixStorybook.ExtraAssignsHelpers':to_variation_id/2 interns elements of "variation_id"; and 'Elixir.PhoenixStorybook.ExtraAssignsHelpers':to_value/4 interns raw string values for attributes declared as :atom or :boolean. BEAM atoms are never garbage-collected, so each unique attacker-controlled string is a permanent allocation. Once the atom table ceiling (~1,048,576 atoms) is reached, the entire BEAM node aborts, taking down all applications running on it.

This issue affects phoenix_storybook from 0.2.0 before 1.1.0.

GHSA-833p-95jq-929q — PhoenixStorybook: Unbounded atom creation from LiveView event params (atom-table DoS)

Affected: Hex: phoenix_storybook

### Summary An attacker who can deliver `psb-assign`, `psb-toggle`, `psb-set-theme`, `upper-tab-navigation`, `lower-tab-navigation`, `playground-change`, or `playground-toggle` LiveView events to a mounted Phoenix Storybook playground can flood the BEAM atom table with attacker-controlled strings, permanently leaking atoms until the VM hits its ~1,048,576 atom ceiling and crashes the entire node. No authentication is required beyond being able to reach the storybook route.

Tabs parsing was introduced in https://github.com/phenixdigital/phoenix_storybook/commit/0228669d55c23a754d1ef11f49a32121129d5395

### Details `PhoenixStorybook.Story.Playground` and `PhoenixStorybook.ExtraAssignsHelpers` converts user-supplied event params into atoms without checking whether the atoms already exist:

- `handle_set_variation_assign/3` (`lib/phoenix_storybook/helpers/extra_assigns_helpers.ex:59`) iterates the event params map and calls `String.to_atom/1` on every key. - `handle_toggle_variation_assign/3` (line 73) calls `String.to_atom/1` on the `"attr"` value supplied by the client. - `to_variation_id/2` (lines 90, 93) calls `String.to_atom/1` on each element of `"variation_id"`. - `to_value/4` (lines 106, 107) calls `String.to_atom/1` on the raw string value for any attribute declared as `:atom` or `:boolean`.

The existing guards do not help: `check_type!/3` for `:boolean` inspects the atom *after* `String.to_atom/1` has already interned it, so the leak has already happened. The `:atom`…