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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 23:37:37 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1486 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans les produits VMware. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provoquer…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1486</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1486</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1486</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-398529</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-398529</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-398529</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-398529</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-84243</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84243</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The gettext family of functions in the GNU C Library version 2.0 and later accept LANGUAGE environment variable entries that contain &amp;#39;/&amp;#39; or that are equal to &amp;#34;..&amp;#34;, unless the program is setuid or setgid (AT_SECURE).  An attacker who can set LANGUAGE in the environment of a program that uses gettext can make it load a message catalog (.mo file) from an arbitrary location in the file system.  A crafted .mo file can crash the program through out-of-range offsets, or supply translations whose format directives do not match the arguments passed by the program.  That causes undefined behaviour in the printf family of functions and may allow arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the program.  The safety of message catalogs relies on them being installed in trusted, read-only locations, and the directory traversal bypasses this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for CVE-2014-0475 rejects &amp;#34;..&amp;#34; path components in locale names passed to setlocale or taken from the LC_ALL, LC_* and LANG environment variables.  gettext reads LANGUAGE directly and appends each colon-separated entry to the message catalog directory, so that fix did not cover LANGUAGE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LANGUAGE is only used when the LC_MESSAGES locale is not &amp;#34;C&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;C.&amp;lt;encoding&amp;gt;&amp;#34; or &amp;#34;POSIX&amp;#34;, so the attacker must also be able to select another installed locale, for example through LANG or LC_ALL.  Exploitation also requires that the attacker can place the crafted file in a location readable by the target program, and that the environment crosses a trust bou…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The gettext family of functions in the GNU C Library version 2.0 and later accept LANGUAGE environment variable entries that contain &amp;#39;/&amp;#39; or that are equal to &amp;#34;..&amp;#34;, unless the program is setuid or setgid (AT_SECURE).  An attacker who can set LANGUAGE in the environment of a program that uses gettext can make it load a message catalog (.mo file) from an arbitrary location in the file system.  A crafted .mo file can crash the program through out-of-range offsets, or supply translations whose format directives do not match the arguments passed by the program.  That causes undefined behaviour in the printf family of functions and may allow arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the program.  The safety of message catalogs relies on them being installed in trusted, read-only locations, and the directory traversal bypasses this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for CVE-2014-0475 rejects &amp;#34;..&amp;#34; path components in locale names passed to setlocale or taken from the LC_ALL, LC_* and LANG environment variables.  gettext reads LANGUAGE directly and appends each colon-separated entry to the message catalog directory, so that fix did not cover LANGUAGE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LANGUAGE is only used when the LC_MESSAGES locale is not &amp;#34;C&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;C.&amp;lt;encoding&amp;gt;&amp;#34; or &amp;#34;POSIX&amp;#34;, so the attacker must also be able to select another installed locale, for example through LANG or LC_ALL.  Exploitation also requires that the attacker can place the crafted file in a location readable by the target program, and that the environment crosses a trust bou…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84243</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8rvm-662m-jvqv</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8rvm-662m-jvqv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The gettext family of functions in the GNU C Library version 2.0 and later accept LANGUAGE environment variable entries that contain &amp;#39;/&amp;#39; or that are equal to &amp;#34;..&amp;#34;, unless the program is setuid or setgid (AT_SECURE).  An attacker who can set LANGUAGE in the environment of a program that uses gettext can make it load a message catalog (.mo file) from an arbitrary location in the file system.  A crafted .mo file can crash the program through out-of-range offsets, or supply translations whose format directives do not match the arguments passed by the program.  That causes undefined behaviour in the printf family of functions and may allow arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the program.  The safety of message catalogs relies on them being installed in trusted, read-only locations, and the directory traversal bypasses this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for CVE-2014-0475 rejects &amp;#34;..&amp;#34; path components in locale names passed to setlocale or taken from the LC_ALL, LC_* and LANG environment variables.  gettext reads LANGUAGE directly and appends each colon-separated entry to the message catalog directory, so that fix did not cover LANGUAGE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LANGUAGE is only used when the LC_MESSAGES locale is not &amp;#34;C&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;C.&amp;lt;encoding&amp;gt;&amp;#34; or &amp;#34;POSIX&amp;#34;, so the attacker must also be able to select another installed locale, for example through LANG or LC_ALL.  Exploitation also requires that the attacker can place the crafted file in a location readable by the target program, and that the environment crosses a trust bou…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The gettext family of functions in the GNU C Library version 2.0 and later accept LANGUAGE environment variable entries that contain &amp;#39;/&amp;#39; or that are equal to &amp;#34;..&amp;#34;, unless the program is setuid or setgid (AT_SECURE).  An attacker who can set LANGUAGE in the environment of a program that uses gettext can make it load a message catalog (.mo file) from an arbitrary location in the file system.  A crafted .mo file can crash the program through out-of-range offsets, or supply translations whose format directives do not match the arguments passed by the program.  That causes undefined behaviour in the printf family of functions and may allow arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the program.  The safety of message catalogs relies on them being installed in trusted, read-only locations, and the directory traversal bypasses this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for CVE-2014-0475 rejects &amp;#34;..&amp;#34; path components in locale names passed to setlocale or taken from the LC_ALL, LC_* and LANG environment variables.  gettext reads LANGUAGE directly and appends each colon-separated entry to the message catalog directory, so that fix did not cover LANGUAGE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LANGUAGE is only used when the LC_MESSAGES locale is not &amp;#34;C&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;C.&amp;lt;encoding&amp;gt;&amp;#34; or &amp;#34;POSIX&amp;#34;, so the attacker must also be able to select another installed locale, for example through LANG or LC_ALL.  Exploitation also requires that the attacker can place the crafted file in a location readable by the target program, and that the environment crosses a trust bou…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8rvm-662m-jvqv</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-84243 — gettext: Directory traversal via the LANGUAGE environment variable</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-84243</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-84243</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-84243</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-4812 — glibc security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-4812</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: glibc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The GNU C Library project provides the core libraries for the GNU system and GNU/Linux systems, as well as many other systems that use Linux as the kernel. These libraries provide critical APIs including ISO C11, POSIX.1-2008, BSD, OS-specific APIs and more. These APIs include such foundational facilities as open, read, write, malloc, printf, getaddrinfo, dlopen, pthread_create, crypt,  login, exit and more.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The gettext family of functions in the GNU C Library version 2.0 and later accept LANGUAGE environment variable entries that contain &amp;amp;apos;/&amp;amp;apos; or that are equal to &amp;amp;quot;..&amp;amp;quot;, unless the program is setuid or setgid (AT_SECURE).  An attacker who can set LANGUAGE in the environment of a program that uses gettext can make it load a message catalog (.mo file) from an arbitrary location in the file system.  A crafted .mo file can crash the program through out-of-range offsets, or supply translations whose format directives do not match the arguments passed by the program.  That causes undefined behaviour in the printf family of functions and may allow arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the program.  The safety of message catalogs relies on them being installed in trusted, read-only locations, and the directory traversal bypasses this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for CVE-2014-0475 rejects &amp;amp;quot;..&amp;amp;quot; path components in locale names passed to setlocale or taken from the LC_ALL, LC_* and LANG environment variables.  gettext reads LANGUAGE directly and…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: glibc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The GNU C Library project provides the core libraries for the GNU system and GNU/Linux systems, as well as many other systems that use Linux as the kernel. These libraries provide critical APIs including ISO C11, POSIX.1-2008, BSD, OS-specific APIs and more. These APIs include such foundational facilities as open, read, write, malloc, printf, getaddrinfo, dlopen, pthread_create, crypt,  login, exit and more.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The gettext family of functions in the GNU C Library version 2.0 and later accept LANGUAGE environment variable entries that contain &amp;amp;apos;/&amp;amp;apos; or that are equal to &amp;amp;quot;..&amp;amp;quot;, unless the program is setuid or setgid (AT_SECURE).  An attacker who can set LANGUAGE in the environment of a program that uses gettext can make it load a message catalog (.mo file) from an arbitrary location in the file system.  A crafted .mo file can crash the program through out-of-range offsets, or supply translations whose format directives do not match the arguments passed by the program.  That causes undefined behaviour in the printf family of functions and may allow arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the program.  The safety of message catalogs relies on them being installed in trusted, read-only locations, and the directory traversal bypasses this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for CVE-2014-0475 rejects &amp;amp;quot;..&amp;amp;quot; path components in locale names passed to setlocale or taken from the LC_ALL, LC_* and LANG environment variables.  gettext reads LANGUAGE directly and…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-4812</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:96401 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs Security Update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:96401</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;glibc: glibc: Arbitrary code execution via directory traversal in LANGUAGE environment variable&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;glibc: glibc: Arbitrary code execution via directory traversal in LANGUAGE environment variable&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:96401</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-84243</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-84243</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: eglibc, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: glibc, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: glibc, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: glibc, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: glibc, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: glibc, Ubuntu:26.10: glibc, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: glibc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The gettext family of functions in the GNU C Library version 2.0 and later accept LANGUAGE environment variable entries that contain &amp;#39;/&amp;#39; or that are equal to &amp;#34;..&amp;#34;, unless the program is setuid or setgid (AT_SECURE).  An attacker who can set LANGUAGE in the environment of a program that uses gettext can make it load a message catalog (.mo file) from an arbitrary location in the file system.  A crafted .mo file can crash the program through out-of-range offsets, or supply translations whose format directives do not match the arguments passed by the program.  That causes undefined behaviour in the printf family of functions and may allow arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the program.  The safety of message catalogs relies on them being installed in trusted, read-only locations, and the directory traversal bypasses this. The fix for CVE-2014-0475 rejects &amp;#34;..&amp;#34; path components in locale names passed to setlocale or taken from the LC_ALL, LC_* and LANG environment variables.  gettext reads LANGUAGE directly and appends each colon-separated entry to the message catalog directory, so that fix did not cover LANGUAGE. LANGUAGE is only used when the LC_MESSAGES locale is not &amp;#34;C&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;C.&amp;lt;encoding&amp;gt;&amp;#34; or &amp;#34;POSIX&amp;#34;, so the attacker must also be able to select another installed locale, for example through LANG or LC_ALL.  Exploitation also requires that the attacker can place the crafted file in a location readable by the target program, and that the environment crosses a trust bound…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: eglibc, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: glibc, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: glibc, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: glibc, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: glibc, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: glibc, Ubuntu:26.10: glibc, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: glibc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The gettext family of functions in the GNU C Library version 2.0 and later accept LANGUAGE environment variable entries that contain &amp;#39;/&amp;#39; or that are equal to &amp;#34;..&amp;#34;, unless the program is setuid or setgid (AT_SECURE).  An attacker who can set LANGUAGE in the environment of a program that uses gettext can make it load a message catalog (.mo file) from an arbitrary location in the file system.  A crafted .mo file can crash the program through out-of-range offsets, or supply translations whose format directives do not match the arguments passed by the program.  That causes undefined behaviour in the printf family of functions and may allow arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the program.  The safety of message catalogs relies on them being installed in trusted, read-only locations, and the directory traversal bypasses this. The fix for CVE-2014-0475 rejects &amp;#34;..&amp;#34; path components in locale names passed to setlocale or taken from the LC_ALL, LC_* and LANG environment variables.  gettext reads LANGUAGE directly and appends each colon-separated entry to the message catalog directory, so that fix did not cover LANGUAGE. LANGUAGE is only used when the LC_MESSAGES locale is not &amp;#34;C&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;C.&amp;lt;encoding&amp;gt;&amp;#34; or &amp;#34;POSIX&amp;#34;, so the attacker must also be able to select another installed locale, for example through LANG or LC_ALL.  Exploitation also requires that the attacker can place the crafted file in a location readable by the target program, and that the environment crosses a trust bound…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-84243</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4269 — GNU libc: Schwachstelle ermöglicht Denial of Service und Codeausführung</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4269</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in GNU libc ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen und um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in GNU libc ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen und um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4269</guid>
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